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In honor cultures (e.g., Turkey, Southern US), self-worth depends on one’s own 
perception and on other people’s opinions about oneself, and reputation is very important. 
In dignity cultures (Northern US, Western Europe), self-worth mainly depends on the 
individual and cannot be taken away by others. In this work, I investigated how people 
from an honor culture, Turkey, and from a dignity culture, northern US, emotionally and 
behaviorally responded to two types of conflict: A true accusation of a transgression and 
negative performance feedback. Honor has three facets common to these two cultures: 
Social respect (being respectable in society), moral behavior (being honest), and self-
respect (feeling proud of oneself). I proposed that true accusations of a transgression 
would be a complete honor threat because they threatened all three facets, whereas private 
negative performance feedback would only be a self-respect threat. I conducted an online 
survey (Experiment 1) and a laboratory study (Experiment 2) to compare the two cultures. 
In Experiment 1, participants read conflict scenarios and imagined themselves as the 
target of the scenario. They indicated how they would feel and behaviorally respond to 
the conflict source (e.g., the accuser). In Experiment 2, participants were actually accused 
by an experimenter for cheating on a task or received negative performance feedback. 
Their emotional and behavioral responses were measured with multiple methods.  
Results revealed that for people from Turkey (an honor culture), being rightfully 
accused of a transgression was more humiliating and anger-provoking than receiving poor 
performance feedback. Moreover, Turkish people became more defensive in response to 
rightful accusations compared to negative performance feedback. I also found that 
northern Americans (a dignity culture), perceived rightful accusations and negative 
performance feedback similarly humiliating and anger-provoking, and they became 
similarly defensive in response to these two threats. These results are in line with the 
vi 
 
importance and centrality of reputation and social respect in honor cultures and the 
emphasis on achievements and positive self-esteem in individualistic dignity cultures. 
The findings of this work may have implications for many contexts such as politics, work 
relations, and romantic relationships.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Your coworker blames you for stealing his/her ideas in front of everyone, even 
though you worked hard to generate them on your own. How would you deal with this 
false accusation? Would you try to avoid your coworker as much as possible, would you 
openly express to him/her your thoughts and feelings about the situation, or would you try 
to embarrass him/her in turn? What about another situation in which your coworker was 
right about his/her accusations and you clearly did something wrong? Would you admit 
your guilt and apologize, would you try to justify your behavior, or would you refuse the 
accusation even though you clearly deserved it? Depending on the circumstances in which 
the two types of conflicts occur, different response styles may be adaptive. In particular, 
the cultural background of the actors and the nature of the relationship between them may 
call for different responses to these accusations. 
In cultures where a person’s social image and reputation is highly important, such 
as Turkey, the falsely accused person may try to restore his/her damaged reputation by 
retaliating or by damaging the offender’s reputation in return. When rightfully accused, 
admitting guilt and apologizing may be difficult for members of these cultures because the 
acknowledgment of doing something wrong may exacerbate the reputation damage. In 
other cultures, where the emphasis is not as much on reputation but on internal self-worth 
and the independent nature of relationships, such as in the northern US, people may still 
disapprove of the false accusation and confront the accuser but not necessarily retaliate. 
When rightfully accused, apologizing may be the common thing to do in these cultures 
because it would not come at a cost to a person’s dignity.  
In this work, I aim to investigate how members of an honor culture (Turkey) and of 
a dignity culture (northern US) differ in their emotional and behavioral responses to 
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conflict situations that involve true accusations. The present work will employ multiple 
methods to investigate the issue, including an online survey and a lab study. The survey 
will examine responses to different conflict types through scenarios, whereas the lab study 
will use a deception set-up to discover emotional and behavioral responses that are closer 
to a real life experience.  
Honor 
The term honor has different definitions and implications depending on the culture 
in which it is applied (Wikan, 2008). Some cultures describe it as virtue, personal honesty 
and integrity, whereas in other cultures it has an additional dimension, namely, a reputation 
for strength and toughness (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; p. 4). This additional component of the 
definition belongs to honor cultures, which are mostly located in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region, the Mediterranean, Latin America and southern states of 
America. In these cultures, honor is not only determined by one’s own perception of self-
worth and virtue, but also by other people’s opinions (Bagli & Sev’er, 2003; Peristiany, 
1965). Moreover, in honor cultures, honor belongs to families as well, such that 
individuals’ honor is dependent on the honorable or dishonorable behaviors of their family 
members (Bagli & Sev’er, 2003; Dural, Erdem, & Uskul, 2006). For example, when a 
family member engages in dishonorable behavior it means that he/she “stained” the family 
honor and the necessary measures need to be taken to cleanse it (e.g., Vandello & Cohen, 
2003). In honor cultures, honor can be easily lost and difficult to regain (Stewart, 1994), 
and losing honor brings a bad social reputation and shame to individuals as well as to their 
family (Bagli & Sev’er, 2003). This also means that any kind of insult or false accusation, 
either to oneself or to one’s family, needs to be responded to, even aggressively if 
necessary (e.g., Gregg, 2005; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996).  
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In dignity cultures, such as northern US and Western Europe, in contrast, honor is a 
private matter and the actions or perceptions of others do not affect one’s self-worth as 
much as in honor cultures. Dignity is based on the idea that individuals possess an inherent 
worth at birth (Ayers, 1984). In that sense, dignity is similar to “an internal skeleton, to a 
hard structure at the center of the self” (Ayers, 1984; p. 20). Different from honor cultures, 
for members of dignity cultures guilt rather than shame is an important determinant of 
behavior. A person with dignity is expected to act according to his/her own standards more 
than the requirements of the social situation. In dignity cultures, one’s self-worth cannot be 
taken away by others, through insults or false accusations; in contrast, self-worth is 
primarily internal. Hence, aggression or retaliation is less common as a response to insults 
in these cultures compared to honor cultures (Leung & Cohen, 2011). 
Despite the differences in the understanding of honor, a prototype study examining 
the concept in an honor (Turkey) and a dignity culture (the northern US) revealed 
similarities in its central elements (Cross et al., 2014). In both cultures, honor has three 
common facets. The social status/respect facet includes features such as “to be respectable 
in the society” and “to be appreciated by others;” the moral behavior facet consists of 
features such as “to be honest” and to be willing to sacrifice;” finally, the self-respect facet 
includes features such as “to feel proud of myself” and “to feel self-esteem” (Cross et al., 
2014, p. 12). Referring to this tripartite structure of honor, in this work, I will focus on two 
types of threats and examine how people from an honor and a dignity culture respond to 
them. The first threat will be a complete honor threat, in which the person will be rightfully 
accused of an immoral/dishonest behavior. I consider rightful accusations a complete honor 
threat because they attack a person’s self-respect (a blameworthy person is usually not 
proud of himself/herself), moral behavior (the person is not honest if he/she has cheated) 
and social respect (a blameworthy person loses the respect of others because of his/her 
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intentional wrongdoing).  The second threat will be a self-respect threat, in which the 
person will privately receive negative feedback about his/her performance, such as 
unintentionally making a big mistake or lacking ability in a task. I expect that this feedback 
will only threaten the self-respect facet of honor but not the social status/respect or moral 
behavior facets. The person’s behavior will not involve an intentional wrongdoing (i.e., no 
attack on morality) and the feedback will not be given publically (i.e., no attack on social 
respect). I predict that the complete honor threat through rightful accusations will make 
people from an honor culture react more negatively than people from a dignity culture, 
whereas the difference may disappear or be reversed for the self-respect threat.  
Turkey and the Northern US 
In MENA societies, the code of honor and Islam provide the primary value systems 
for individuals (Gregg, 2005). As one of the MENA societies, Turkey is located in two 
continents (Europe and Asia) and can be considered a Mediterranean and a Middle Eastern 
country. Similar to other MENA societies, Turkish culture is predominantly shaped by the 
honor code and the vast majority of the population is Muslim. Unlike its Middle Eastern 
neighbors, however, Turkey has a more secular political system (e.g., Keddie, 2004). 
Moreover, Turkey is highly collectivistic and high in power distance (i.e., the belief that 
high power people should have privileges and be respected; Hofstede, 1980, 2001). 
Research on the concept of honor in Turkey began in the fields of sociology and 
anthropology in the form of qualitative studies (e.g., Bagli & Sev’er, 2003; Kardam, 2005), 
and recently expanded to psychology. Turkey, however, is still a society that is 
understudied in cross-cultural psychology (Uskul et al., 2012). 
Psychological research comparing Turkey and the northern US has found 
similarities and differences in the definition and implications of honor. As mentioned 
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previously, a prototype study revealed the social status/respect, moral behavior, and self-
respect facets in both cultures (Cross et al., 2014). There are, however, important cultural 
differences in the meaning of honor and the impact of honor-related situations. For 
example, when asked to define the meaning of honor, Turkish participants generated a 
greater number of differentiated honor features than northern Americans, suggesting that 
honor is a more complex concept in Turkey (Cross et al., 2014). Moreover, Turkish 
features of honor were more likely to focus on actions to be avoided (e.g., not telling lies) 
compared to northern American features of honor (e.g., doing the right thing; Cross et al., 
2014). Another study has found that honor-attacking situations generated in Turkey had 
greater perceived impact on close others (e.g., insulting someone’s family) and were more 
likely to involve a relational or collective audience (e.g., humiliating someone in front of a 
classroom), compared to the situations generated by northern Americans. Finally, Turkish 
participants were more likely to generate honor-attacking situations that involved false 
accusations and unfair treatment than were Americans, whereas Americans generated more 
situations that were about negative character and lack of achievement (Uskul et al., 2012).  
Cultural Differences in Responses to Honor Threats 
Studies comparing honor and dignity cultures have revealed that when honor is 
threatened, members of each culture display different emotional and behavioral reactions 
(Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Compared to members of dignity cultures, members of honor 
cultures become more stressed and experience more anger and shame when there is a 
potential honor threat (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996; IJzerman, van Dijk, & 
Gallucci, 2007; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002). In terms of behavioral 
differences, members of honor cultures are more prepared for aggression and engage in 
more dominance behaviors when there is a potential honor threat compared to members of 
dignity cultures (Cohen et al., 1996; IJzerman, van Dijk, & Gallucci, 2007; Rodriguez 
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Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002). Moreover, Turkish participants are more likely to 
approve of people who confronted an accuser than people who did not confront (Cross et 
al., 2012). More direct behavioral evidence for cultural differences in responses to honor 
threats comes from an experimental lab study, in which Turkish participants who received 
insulting feedback on an essay retaliated more than American participants who received the 
same feedback (Uskul, Cross, Günsoy, Gercek-Swing, Alozkan, & Ataca, 2015).  
Honor threats are likely to occur in conflict situations; however, there has not been 
extensive research on the types of conflict that can lead to an honor threat and the possible 
response strategies actors can use. In this work, I will focus on the issue of honor from a 
conflict management perspective and discuss a variety of response strategies that have been 
covered in conflict research. Moreover, different from previous studies on honor and 
dignity cultures, I will investigate rightful accusations as a type of conflict that could be 
perceived as an honor threat.   
Conflict Management in Interpersonal Relationships 
Conflicts occur when there is an opposition from or disagreement with others 
regarding various issues such as opinions, norms, or treatment of each other (Ohbuchi & 
Tedeschi, 1997). Another source of conflict is to have different preferences regarding the 
ways to accomplish a goal and the resulting difficulties in getting the outcomes individuals 
seek (Shapiro & Kulik, 2004). Individuals have distinct conflict management or conflict 
resolution strategies, which can be defined as a set of behaviors that are intended or 
actually displayed to overcome conflicts (Boulding, 1963; Gelfand, Leslie, Keller, & de 
Dreu, 2012; Thomas, 1976; Van de Vliert, 1997). The extensive research on conflict 
management has revealed three broad types of strategies from which actors can choose: 
Competition, which includes efforts to dominate the partner and win the conflict situation; 
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avoidance, which is the tendency to suppress the expression or importance of the conflict 
and to avoid addressing it, and cooperation, which is about engaging in constructive 
negotiations and problem solving (Gelfand et al., 2012; Table 1).  
Even though many different conflict management strategies fall under these three 
categories, research has mainly converged on the dual concern theory (Pruitt & Rubin, 
1986) as a guideline for a more detailed classification of conflict management strategies 
(e.g., De Dreu, Evers, Beersma, Kluwer, & Nauta, 2001). How individuals deal with 
conflict depends on the level of concern they have for their own and for the other person’s 
interests (Blake & Mouton, 1964). Evolved from these premises, the dual concern theory 
suggests that people can choose from five types of response styles to conflict (e.g., De 
Dreu et al., 2001). On the most competitive level, they can choose to force or dominate the 
other party through threats, retaliation or persuasive arguments with the purpose of winning 
the conflict (high self-concern and low other-concern). Similar to the broad tripartite 
distinction, another strategy according to the dual concern theory is avoiding, which means 
not to think about the conflict or to make it seem less important (low self- and other-
concern). As a cooperative strategy, conflict partners can choose to yield or suppress, 
which involves accepting the other party’s will or offering help and compensation (low 
self-concern and high other-concern). Alternatively, they can engage in problem solving or 
integration by examining ideas from both sides and working out a solution that would 
satisfy both sides (high self- and other-concern). Finally, they can compromise or try to 
find a middle-way in which both sides give in a little (intermediate self- and other-concern; 
De Dreu et al., 2001; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Van de Vliert, 1997; Table 1).  
There are also conflict management strategies that are more indirect than those the 
dual concern theory suggests (e.g., Adair & Brett, 2004; Ting-Toomey et al., 2001). 
Passive aggressive responses, which would fall under the competitive category, involve 
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indirect behaviors to threaten the conflict partner. An example could be publically 
expressing concerns about the conflict in a general way without specifically addressing to 
the conflict partner (Ting-Toomey et al., 2001; Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, Manstead, & 
Zaalberg, 2008). Third-party help is another indirect method to deal with conflict, which 
involves an outsider to resolve or mediate the conflict (Ohbuchi & Tedeshi, 1997; Ting-
Toomey et al., 2001). Because there is effort to solve the issue, this would fall under the 
cooperative conflict management category (Table 1).  
When a conflict occurs because one side is clearly blameworthy and rightfully 
accused, there may be additional response options as well as other sub-dimensions of the 
existing classifications of conflict management strategies. One of the most competitive 
ways to deal with conflicts, in which the person is clearly blameworthy, is refusing the 
accusation. This involves the denial of personal responsibility of the offense or blaming 
others (Schönbach, 1980; Schütz, 1998). Alternatively, transgressors can provide 
justifications, in which they try to legitimize their action by trivializing the harm or 
suggesting that their action may even have positive effects in the long run (Schönbach, 
1980; Tedeschi & Riess, 1981). This would be considered as another competitive strategy 
because the person is trying to win the conflict. Transgressors could also find excuses for 
what they did (Schönbach, 1980; Tedeschi & Riess, 1981). They would admit that they are 
responsible for the transgression but also provide explanations such as emphasizing factors 
beyond their control or stating that they did not intend to harm the person. In that sense, 
finding excuses could be considered an avoidant conflict strategy because transgressors do 
not address the conflict directly but divert the focus on explanations for their behavior and 
minimize the negative inferences about themselves (Schütz, 1998). Research on 
forgiveness, however, has shown that if a person wants to be forgiven, he/she needs to 
provide a sincere apology (Fehr, Gelfand, & Nag, 2010). Hence, the most cooperative 
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strategy, elaborate apologies, requires the offender to admit that the event has occurred and 
he/she was responsible (Schönbach, 1980; Tedeschi & Riess, 1981). The individual also 
expresses regret and sometimes offers compensations (Table 1). Apologies and excuses are 
called mitigating accounts that can reduce conflicts and are used in severe interpersonal 
conflict situations (Gonzales, Pederson, Manning, & Wetter, 1990; McLaughlin, Cody, & 
O'Hair, 1983). Apologies, especially, effectively reduce negative sanctions (e.g., Darby & 
Schlenker, 1989; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989).  
How do individuals choose from this set of conflict management strategies? 
“Conflict style is a combination of traits (e.g., cultural background or personality) and 
states (e.g., situation)” (Ting-Toomey et al., 2001; p. 88). To answer this question, I will 
focus on culture on the “trait” side and examine how it is related to the ways people 
manage conflicts. Members of individualistic and collectivistic cultures, for example, may 
perceive and resolve conflicts differently, due to the dominant values and norms of their 
culture (e.g., Chua & Gudykunst, 1987). The next section will discuss these cultural 
differences. 
Culture and Conflict Management 
Individualism-collectivism has been one of the most prominent frameworks used to 
describe cultural differences in various aspects of social life, including conflict 
management (e.g., Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 1989). In individualistic cultures, the 
emphasis is on the needs and goals of the individual, the relationships are independent and 
voluntary, and the dominant motivation is to have positive self-esteem. In collectivistic 
societies, however, the emphasis is on one’s ingroups and on maintaining harmony because 
of the strong interdependence in the society (e.g., Adams, 2005; Hofstede, 2001). For these 
reasons, conflict management in individualistic cultures focuses more on distributing 
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resources than on relationships, whereas in collectivistic cultures the pattern is the opposite 
(Adair & Brett, 2004). In individualistic cultures, therefore, competitive,  assertive and 
active methods to deal with conflict are perceived as normal and acceptable, whereas  
people from collectivistic cultures tend to choose cooperative, non-assertive, and passive 
responses to conflict (e.g., Chua & Gudykunst, 1987; Gabrielidis, Stephan, Ybarra, Dos 
Santos Pearson, & Villareal, 1997; Ohbushi, Fukushima, & Tedeschi, 1999). For example, 
Japanese people (collectivistic culture) prefer cooperative, mitigating accounts after a 
transgression such as providing apologies and excuses, whereas Americans (individualistic 
culture) prefer competitive accounts such as providing justifications for a transgression 
(Itoi, Ohbuchi, & Fukuno, 1996; Takaku, 2000). Moreover, people from collectivistic 
cultures are more likely to prefer indirect methods to resolve conflicts, such as involving a 
third party, compared to individualistic cultures (Ting-Toomey, 1988; Tinsley, 2004). 
These differences suggest that conflict in collectivistic societies is not perceived as an 
isolated incident but as a threat to the harmony of the relationship (Ting-Toomey, 1988; 
Tinsley, 2004).  
Collectivism and individualism, however, are broad terms, and there are varieties of 
collectivistic and individualistic cultures across the world with different dominant values. 
As mentioned earlier, in this work, I will focus on an honor culture - Turkey - as an 
example of a collectivistic culture where reputation and social image are strongly 
emphasized and defended (e.g., Bagli & Sev’er, 2003). I will compare it to a dignity 
culture – the northern US – as an example of an individualistic culture where the focus is 
less on social image and more on the individual’s inherent self-worth (Leung & Cohen, 
2011).  
Honor and conflict management. Honor can be threatened or lost in conflict 
situations. An insult coming from the conflict partner, for example, can damage the honor 
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of the insulted party (Harinck, Shafa, Ellemers, & Beersma, 2013). In conflicts that involve 
an honor threat, therefore, members of honor cultures or people who endorse strong honor 
values tend to choose competitive, confrontational, or aggressive responses more than 
members of dignity cultures and people with weaker endorsement of honor values 
(Beersma et al., 2003; Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996).  
Politeness is also highly valued and emphasized in honor cultures because it is a 
preemptive tool for not offending others and for preventing the escalation of conflicts and 
violence (Cohen & Vandello, 2004). When there is no threat to honor, competitive or 
confrontational conflict management strategies may be riskier in honor cultures than in 
dignity cultures, because they are likely to be reciprocated by similar strategies (Harinck et 
al., 2013; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). In conflicts that do not involve an honor threat, 
therefore, members of honor cultures choose less aggressive, more avoidance-oriented and 
more cooperative responses compared to members of dignity cultures (Beersma et al., 
2003; Cohen et al., 1996; Harinck et al., 2013).  
As mentioned previously, the concept of honor has three dimensions in Turkey and 
in the US, namely, the social status/respect dimension (e.g., to be appreciated by others, to 
be respectable in the society), the moral behavior dimension (e.g., to be honest, to be 
willing to sacrifice) and the self-respect dimension (e.g., to feel proud of myself, to feel 
self-esteem; Cross et al., 2014). To have a comprehensive understanding of cultural 
differences in conflict management, I will include conflicts that arise from a complete 
honor threat (true accusations) that I expect to attack all three dimensions as well as a self-
respect threat (negative performance feedback) that attacks only one of the dimensions. 
Previous studies on honor have focused on false accusations or insults as honor threats but 
no study has examined true accusations. I expect that true accusations, such as being 
rightfully accused of cheating, can be considered a more complete honor threat than false 
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accusations because they attack a person’s self-respect (a blameworthy person is usually 
not proud of himself/herself), moral behavior (the person is not honest if he/she has 
cheated) and social respect (a blameworthy person loses the respect of others because of 
his/her intentional wrongdoing). When someone is falsely accused, in contrast, he/she 
knows that there is a misunderstanding and his/her morality and self-respect may not be 
threatened as much.  
In this study, I expect that Turkish people will be more likely to experience negative 
emotions such as shame and humiliation after a true accusation - a complete honor threat- 
compared to northern Americans. Moreover, Turkish people will be less likely to apologize 
after a true accusation but may be more likely to choose competitive responses compared 
to northern Americans. The next section will discuss the underlying reasons for these 
differences.  
True Accusations 
Sometimes individuals are accused because there is evidence to prove that they 
intentionally did something wrong. How do they feel and respond when they face a true 
accusation? In October 2013, the US Republican congressman Trey Radel was charged for 
cocaine possession. He delivered an emotional apology on TV for his charge, in which he 
openly admitted responsibility and asked for forgiveness (Fahrenthold, Alexander & 
Horwitz, 2011). In December 2013, businessmen close to the Turkish Prime Minister 
Erdogan and three ministers' sons were detained because of allegations of bribery and illicit 
money transfers (Tattersall & Butler, 2014). The prime minister himself was claimed to be 
involved in the corruption scandal according to telephone tapes leaked in the internet, in 
which he orders his son to get rid of millions of dollars in incriminating cash (Letsch, 
2014). Despite the evidence, protests and pressure to resign, he rejected the allegations, 
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blamed “outside forces” for the scandal (Young, 2013) and tightened control of the Internet 
(Tattersall & Butler, 2014). What are the reasons behind different approaches to rightful 
accusations? Does the cultural background of the two politicians play a role in how they 
deal with these accusations? Are members of honor cultures reluctant to admit their guilt 
because it would leave a permanent “stain” on their reputation?  
There is extensive research on how members of honor cultures feel and respond 
when they are falsely accused; however to my knowledge, there is no research that 
focuses on how they feel and respond when they are the offender or when they are 
rightfully accused. I expect to find differences between honor and dignity cultures in their 
reactions to true accusations, mainly because of the emphasis on reputation in situations 
where the person is blameworthy (Gonzales et al. 1992).  
True Accusation as a Reputation Threat  
In intentional transgressions, the offender’s reputation is threatened more 
compared to transgressions that are results of accidents or negligence. When people 
intentionally cheat, lie or harm another person, their destructiveness, immorality, and lack 
of mindfulness represent a reputation threat for them.  In these situations, apologizing 
may not be preferred because admitting guilt and responsibility would threaten the 
reputation of the offender even more. Blameworthy offenders, therefore, may become 
defensive and provide excuses or justifications rather than apologies (Gonzales et al. 
1992; Hodgins, Liebeskind, & Schwartz, 1996b).  
Reproach behavior is another factor that could influence the willingness of the 
offender to apologize. Being severely called out for the wrongdoing challenges the 
offenders’ behavior, but it also suggests their imperfection and brings their self-worth and 
reputation under threat. When the reproach is severe, therefore, offenders become 
defensive, more concerned for their own reputation rather than the victim’s, and hence, 
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less likely to apologize (Hodgins & Liebeskind, 2003). Due to the strong emphasis on 
protecting one’s own reputation and the importance of other people’s opinions, I expect 
that members of honor cultures may have a lower threshold for defensiveness when they 
are the blameworthy offenders compared to the members of dignity cultures.  
Blameworthy offenders can choose from a wide range of behavioral options such 
as finding excuses or justifications for their behavior or refusing to admit the wrong-
doing (e.g., Schönbach, 1980). Research on forgiveness, however, has shown that if a 
person wants to be forgiven, not to be punished severely, or to feel as though they are 
someone who has integrity, he/she needs to provide a sincere apology (Fehr et al., 2010). 
Despite these multiple benefits of apologies, some people are less willing and less likely 
to apologize than others (Darby & Schlenker, 1989; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989; 
Okimoto, Wenzel, & Hedrick, 2013). In this work, I will focus on culture and emotions as 
potential factors underlying the differences in people’s willingness to apologize and to 
choose other conflict resolution strategies.  
Cultural Differences in Apologies 
Most of the cross-cultural studies in the apology literature have focused on East 
Asian and northern American cultures. They have found cultural differences in the 
likelihood, meaning, and function of apologies. For example, Japanese people prefer 
cooperative and nonassertive accounts, such as apologies and excuses, more than 
competitive and assertive accounts, such as providing justifications for transgressions. 
Moreover, northern Americans prefer competitive and assertive accounts more than 
Japanese (Itoi, Ohbuchi, & Fukuno, 1996; Takaku, 2000). The reason for these 
differences are attributed to the collectivistic culture of Japan, where maintaining social 
harmony and good relationships matter most, as opposed to the individualistic culture of 
the northern US, which emphasizes the attainment of personal goals and satisfaction. 
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Another study comparing Japan and the northern US revealed that for Japanese, apologies 
were a way of expressing remorse, whereas for Americans, they were means of assigning 
blame. This finding was explained by the attributional differences in the two cultures. 
Whereas the collectivistic culture of Japan make people more likely to attribute the causes 
of events to situational factors, the individualistic culture of the northern US emphasizes 
attribution of the causes to individual or dispositional factors (Maddux, Kim, Okumura, & 
Brett, 2011).  
Other cross-cultural studies, however, have revealed conflicting and complicating 
results. For example, Japanese respondents were not different from British or Canadian 
respondents in their frequency of apology use (Tanaka, Spencer-Oatey, & Cray, 2000). In 
another study, Chinese people were less likely to apologize than Americans, but Koreans 
had more positive perceptions of apologizing than Americans (Park & Guan, 2006; Park, 
Lee, & Song, 2005). These studies have examined East Asian cultures, which are more 
collectivistic than Western cultures; however, the generalizability of these findings to 
MENA cultures is unknown. The mixed results and the lack of a focus on cultures other 
than the ones in East Asia render it necessary to have a focus on specific types of 
collectivistic and individualistic cultures, such as honor and dignity cultures, as well as on 
the emotions that are prominent in each culture.  
The Role of Emotions 
Emotions of guilt and shame experienced by transgressors are related to people’s 
perception of and responses to true accusations, especially in their likelihood to 
apologize. Whereas guilt is positively associated with apologizing, shame is negatively 
associated with it (Howell, 2012). The potential reason behind the opposite roles of guilt 
and shame is that guilt focuses on the action, in this case on the wrong-doing, whereas 
16 
 
shame focuses on the entire self of the transgressor (Tangney, 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 
2002; Tangney, Youman, & Stuewig, 2009). Guilt is more about the relation of people's 
actions with the rules, whereas shame is more about people's relation to an audience or a 
community (Cohen, 2003). Therefore, feeling guilty turns the focus of the transgressor to 
his/her action and to its impact on the victim, and tends to make the transgressor more 
likely to apologize. Feeling shame, in contrast, makes transgressors more concerned about 
how they are perceived by others and therefore they may prefer justifications or 
externalizations of the action rather than concessions (Howell et al., 2012).  
Implications for Honor and Dignity Cultures 
 Being truly blamed for an intentional wrong-doing is not only a reputation threat 
but also a potentially shameful experience. Shame is highly valued in honor cultures and 
indicates that the individual is concerned about his/her honor (e.g., Peristiany, 1965; Pitt-
Rivers, 1977). A study examining the antecedents and action tendencies related to shame 
showed that Spanish participants (an honor culture) mentioned public evaluations more 
than Dutch participants (a dignity culture) as antecedents of shame, whereas Dutch 
participants mentioned self-failure more than Spanish participants (Rodriguez Mosquera, 
Manstead, & Fischer, 2000). Moreover, compared to Dutch participants, Spanish 
participants more often reported that they wanted to escape from shame-related situations 
(Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000). In conflict situations in which the individual is 
blameworthy, this escape tendency may translate into an unwillingness to offer an 
apology.  
There are also dynamics that are specific to the American society that may 
influence the likelihood of apologies in that culture. American society is becoming more 
individualistic. It is creating individuals who are free from conventional restraints, but at 
the same time it is putting more emphasis on morality (Cohen, 2003). These two 
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dynamics may seem conflicting at first, but they may lead to a similar behavioral 
tendency when it comes to transgressions. Individualism gives people the freedom to 
define their own rules and criteria for good and bad, as well as to pick their own reference 
groups and audiences (Cohen, 2003). This may make people care less about what other 
people think and feel less ashamed in front of others, especially if those “others” do not 
belong to their selected audience in their perception. Supporting this idea, the term shame 
has been diminishing in dictionaries and is giving way to other terms that are related to 
internal self-evaluations and worth such as self-esteem, pride and dignity (Cohen, 2003). 
Moreover, guilt-related terms are becoming more prominent than shame, which could be 
related to the emphasis on morality (Cohen, 2003). Morality, especially in the form of 
religious morality, is very prominent in American society, and compared to other 
industrialized countries, Americans are more likely to believe in God, sin, heaven and hell 
(Inglehart, 1997). The emphasis on morality may underlie the prominence of guilt in the 
language; it may make people more likely to experience guilt after doing something 
offensive and more willing to apologize. As mentioned previously, guilt is positively 
associated with apologizing, whereas shame is negatively associated with it (Howell, 
2012).  
In honor cultures, the prominence of shame, the concern about not losing 
reputation by admitting the wrongdoing, and the desire to escape public judgment may 
overshadow individuals’ concern for others’ needs or for being honest and transparent. To 
defend their honor, members of honor cultures may need to be sensitive to a broad range 
of offenses and potential reputation threats, including seemingly trivial ones (Cohen, 
2003). After being rightfully accused for an act, apologizing in the form of admitting guilt 
may not be common in honor cultures because it could be perceived as a reputation threat. 
Being constantly on guard against losing reputation may make individuals from honor 
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cultures less willing to cooperate or to apologize, but more willing to compete or to 
justify their behavior and refuse the accusation, compared to members of dignity cultures 
(Table 1 and 2).  
The Present Experiments 
To test my predictions, I employed two experiments with different methodologies. 
The first experiment was an online survey, in which Turkish and northern American 
participants indicated their emotional and behavioral reactions to conflict scenarios that 
involved complete honor threats in the form of true accusations and self-respect threats in 
the form of negative task-related performance feedback. The second experiment was a 
laboratory study that was conducted in Turkey and in the northern US. Some participants 
were encouraged to cheat on a task and were truly accused later on and other participants 
received poor performance feedback. The main difference between these conditions were 
the intentionality of the target’s behavior, namely, he/she engaged in an intentional 
transgression in the complete honor threat condition (true accusation) or performed 
poorly in the self-respect threat condition (negative performance feedback). I examined 
the differences and similarities in the emotional and behavioral responses to these threats 
in the two cultural groups. I also included a control condition - no threat (neutral 
feedback) - that lacked the undesirable behavior of the target (transgression / mistake) and 
the negative response as a result of his / her behavior (i.e., accusation / negative 
performance feedback). This condition served as a baseline comparison condition for the 
two cultural groups. I included a second control condition – social respect threat (false 
accusation) – that also lacked the undesirable behavior of the target (transgression / 
mistake) but included the negative response to the target (accusation). Thereby, I wanted 
to distinguish between the effects of the targets’ undesirable behaviors and the effects of 
the accusation or negative performance feedback they received.  
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In both experiments, participants explicitly reported their emotions on respective 
scales and in Experiment 2 (the laboratory study), they also indicated how they perceived 
faces that depicted different kinds of emotions. The latter task served as a projective 
measure that collected information on participants’ sensitivity to certain types of 
emotions after being exposed to different types of threats. In Experiment 1 (online 
scenario study), participants also reported their level of preference for behavioral 
responses that were competitive, avoidant, and cooperative, as well as their expectations 
for others’ approval of those behaviors. In Experiment 2, participants wrote down their 
reactions after being actually accused or received negative performance feedback. They 
also played a bargaining game (ultimatum game) with the experimenter who was the 
accuser/feedback provider to obtain information about how they would really treat a 
threat source. This game gave them an opportunity to retaliate by making bargaining 
decisions that were disadvantageous to the threat source at the expense of their own gain. 
Moreover, in Experiment 2, participants evaluated the threat source (e.g., the 
experimenter who accuses them) on various dimensions such as helpfulness and 
respectfulness. These evaluations were a measure of defensive tendencies, such that the 
more participants were defensive the more I expected that they would rate the threat 
source negatively. 
Hypotheses  
Initially, I only made predictions about cross-cultural differences in emotional and 
behavioral responses to accusations or negative feedback. Examining the mean 
differences between cultures, however, can be misleading due to the reference group 
effect (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002). When participants complete Likert-
type scales, they tend to compare themselves not to a different cultural group but to others 
in their own society; in other words, their reference group is people in their own society. 
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This may not only make cultural differences in psychological constructs disappear but 
also reverse them in some cases. Compared to a sole focus on cross-cultural mean 
differences, examining the within-culture patterns of constructs provides more accurate 
and methodologically less biased results (Bond & van de Vijver, 2010). Therefore, I also 
came up with within-culture predictions, in which I focused on differences in emotional 
and behavioral responses across accusation/feedback conditions within each culture.  
Overall, I expected that Turkish participants (an honor culture) would respond 
more negatively to true accusations (a complete honor threat) compared to northern 
Americans (a dignity culture) and compared to negative performance feedback (a self-
respect threat). Northern Americans, however, were expected to respond similarly to true 
accusations and negative performance feedback.  
Hypothesis group 1: Culture and emotional responses. In both experiments, 
when there was a true accusation (a complete honor threat), Turkish people would be 
more likely to experience negative emotions compared to Americans (Hypothesis 1a), but 
I did not expect any cultural differences for positive emotions (Hypothesis 1b, Table 2a).  
In addition to the overall negative emotions, I examined the within-culture pattern 
of specific negative emotions, such as shame, guilt, humiliation-related emotions (e.g., 
feeling humiliated, belittled), and anger-related emotions (e.g., angry, hostile). I predicted 
that Turkish participants in the true accusation condition (a complete honor threat) would 
experience the strongest shame and humiliation-related emotions compared to Turkish 
participants in other conditions. In northern US, however, I expected participants in the 
true accusation (a complete honor threat) and negative performance feedback conditions 
(a self-respect threat) to experience these emotions at a similar level (Hypothesis 1c). 
Moreover, when there was a true accusation (a complete honor threat) the experience of 
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shame would be more intense than the experience of guilt for Turkish people, whereas for 
Americans the pattern would be the opposite (Hypothesis 1d). Finally, I hypothesized that 
participants in both cultures who were in the false accusation condition (a social-respect 
threat) would be most angry compared to those in other conditions, because they do not 
deserve the accusation. Turkish participants in the true accusation condition (a complete 
honor threat) would be more likely to experience anger-related emotions compared to 
Turkish participants in the remaining conditions. In northern US, however, participants in 
the true accusation (a complete honor threat) and negative performance feedback 
conditions (a self-respect threat) would feel anger-related emotions at a similar level 
(Hypothesis 1e, Table 2a). 
Hypothesis group 2: Culture and behavioral responses. I expected that in both 
experiments, when there was a true accusation (a complete honor threat), Turkish people 
would be more likely to prefer competitive (e.g., retaliation, justification) but less likely 
to prefer cooperative responses (e.g., apology) compared to Americans. Moreover, 
Turkish people would be more defensive in this condition, indicated by an unfavorable 
evaluation of the experimenter/feedback provider (Experiment 2; Hypothesis 2a). When 
there was negative performance feedback (a self-respect threat), however, I predicted that 
Turkish people would be more likely to choose avoidant and indirect cooperative 
responses (i.e., consulting third party) compared to Americans. They would also be less 
defensive than northern Americans in this condition indicated by a favorable evaluation 
of the experimenter/feedback provider (Experiment 2; Hypothesis 2b; Table 2b and 2c).  
I also hypothesized that in both cultures, participants who were falsely accused (a 
social respect threat) would be most likely to choose competitive responses, least likely to 
choose cooperative responses, and most likely to be defensive. Moreover, Turkish 
participants in the true accusation condition (a complete honor threat) were expected to be 
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more likely to prefer competitive responses, less likely to prefer cooperative responses, 
and more likely to be defensive compared to those in the remaining conditions. In 
northern US, however, participants in the true accusation (a complete honor threat) and 
negative performance feedback conditions (a self-respect threat) would be similar in their 
preference for competitive and cooperative responses and in their defensiveness 
(Hypothesis 2c; Table 2b and 2c).  
In both experiments, the threat came from a higher power person to have a 
conservative approach. People are more likely to apologize to higher power than lower 
power accusers, especially in high power distance cultures like Turkey (e.g., Takaku, 
2000). Because of the honor threatening aspect of true accusations, I expected that 
Turkish people would apologize less than Americans; however, in situations where the 
threat came from a higher power person this cultural difference would be reduced. 




CHAPTER 2. PILOT STUDY 
Method 
I conducted a pilot study to select the scenarios for Experiment 1. I expected the 
most appropriate scenarios to be similar in the clarity across threat conditions (e.g., easy 
to understand) but different in terms of the manipulated aspects (e.g., deservingness of the 
accusation).  
Participants 
Participants were undergraduate students at Iowa State University in northern US 
(n = 143, 71 women) and at Sabanci University in Turkey (n = 136, 52 women; see 
Appendix A for the Institutional Review Board approval). They received course credit for 
participation. The northern American sample consisted of 117 European-American, six 
African-American, four Latino/a, two multiracial American, and 10 international 
students. Only European-American participants were included in the analyses. Moreover, 
in northern US, 11 participants indicated that they had participated in a study that 
measured similar constructs and therefore were excluded from the analyses. There was no 
participant in the Turkish sample who had participated in a similar study. The final 
sample consisted of 109 participants (52 women) in northern US and 136 participants (52 
women) in Turkey. Average age was 20.45 (SD = 1.47) in northern US and 23.19 in 
Turkey (SD = 1.73).  
Design 
The pilot study was conducted as a between-subjects design. Participants from 
Turkey and northern US were randomly assigned to one of the four threat conditions (true 
accusation, negative performance feedback, false accusation, or neutral feedback). 
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Materials and Procedure 
The study was conducted online (Qualtrics). Participants in each threat condition 
read three out of seven scenarios that involved different conflict topics (e.g., plagiarism, 
lying, stealing etc.). There were three university scenarios and four work place scenarios. 
Each participant read one university scenario and two work place scenarios that were 
randomly selected and ordered. Names in the scenarios were matched by gender and 
culture of the participant. Scenarios were adapted from Cross et al.’s (2012), Cross, Uskul 
& Wasti’s (2014), Gonzales’s (1992), and Guinote’s (2008) work. 
Targets in the scenarios were rightfully or falsely accused, given negative 
performance feedback, or given neutral feedback by a higher power person (e.g., manager 
or class project leader). Participants were asked to imagine themselves as the target in the 
scenario as vividly as possible, even if the situation was not something they would 
encounter in their life. Below are the four threat conditions for the plagiarism at work 
scenario (see Appendix B for other scenarios).  
True accusation. You are an entry level employee in the creative department of 
an advertising agency and Amanda is the head of the department. At the end of the year, 
she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine your 
salary for next year and whether you will get a bonus or not. You work closely with 
Amanda in a project group, which is developing an advertisement strategy for a new 
product for one of the agency’s clients. One day, the project group holds a meeting in 
which everyone presents their ideas to the client. You had been struggling with generating 
good strategies and decided to take a risk. You looked at the company archives and found 
Amanda’s projects from 5 years ago. You took the ideas you liked and presented them as 
if they were yours. Once you finish your presentation, Amanda comes to your office and 
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says: “These are good ideas; however, I wish they were yours. How could you think that I 
wouldn’t remember my own ideas from my own projects?” You realize you are being 
rightfully accused of dishonesty. 
Negative performance feedback. You are an entry level employee in the creative 
department of an advertising agency and Amanda is the head of the department. At the 
end of the year, she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will 
determine your salary for next year and whether you will get a bonus or not. You work 
closely with Amanda in a project group, which is developing an advertisement strategy 
for a new product for one of the agency’s clients. One day, the project group holds a 
meeting in which everyone presents their ideas to the client. You have been working hard 
on this on your own in the last month and you are confident that you did a good job. Once 
the meeting is over, Amanda calls you to her office and says: “These are good ideas; 
however, they are not comprehensive enough. You did not cover any outdoor 
advertisement strategies, which were clearly mentioned in the briefing document I gave 
you. Our clients were not happy about it and they even implied that they may not work 
with us next year.”  You realize you made a big mistake.  
False accusation. You are an entry level employee in the creative department of 
an advertising agency and Amanda is the head of the department. At the end of the year, 
she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine your 
salary for next year and whether you will get a bonus or not. You work closely with 
Amanda in a project group, which is developing an advertisement strategy for a new 
product for one of the agency’s clients. One day, the project group holds a meeting in 
which everyone presents their ideas to the client. You have been working hard on this on 
your own in the last month and you are confident that you did a good job. Once you finish 
your presentation, Amanda calls you to her office and says: “These are good ideas; 
26 
 
however, I wish they were yours. I was the one who mentioned these ideas in our last 
group meeting.” You realize you are being falsely accused of dishonesty. 
Neutral feedback. You are an entry level employee in the creative department of 
an advertising agency and Amanda is the head of the department. At the end of the year, 
she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine your 
salary for next year and whether you will get a bonus or not. You work closely with 
Amanda in a project group, which is developing an advertisement strategy for a new 
product for one of the agency’s clients.  One day, the project group holds a meeting in 
which everyone presents their ideas to the client. You have been working hard on this on 
your own in the last month and you feel that you did a satisfactory job. Once the meeting 
is over, Amanda calls you to her office and says: “This was a good meeting. Let’s talk 
about the timeline that the client requested and plan for the next month’s project.”  You 
feel relieved that you were prepared.   
Questions. After each scenario, participants summarized the scenario in their own 
words and indicated how the situation would make them think, feel, or behave. The 
purpose of this part was to make participants think about the scenarios carefully. 
Participants also answered close-ended questions about the scenarios and they used a 
scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). To evaluate the overall valence of the situation, 
participants rated how positive, desirable, and pleasant each situation was. To evaluate 
the clarity of the scenarios, participants rated how clear, understandable, and realistic 
each scenario was. Participants also evaluated the feedback fairness by rating the 
intentionality and responsibility of the target for the behavior that caused him/her to be 
accused or to receive feedback, as well as to what degree he/she deserved the 
accusation/feedback. To examine the perception of honor threat, participants indicated to 
what degree they thought the situation would threaten their reputation, others’ respect, 
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value in the society, status in the society, self-worth, and confidence (taken from Cross et 
al., 2014). Finally, they evaluated to what degree the situation would make them feel 
humiliated, offended, criticized, ashamed, guilty, angry at the threat source (negative 
emotions) and attentive, alert, and calm (positive emotions; in randomized order; taken 
from Cross, Uskul & Wasti, 2014; Kitayama, Park, Sevincer, Karasawa, & Uskul, 2009; 
Uskul et al., 2014). 
Results 
I first computed composite scores for valence (average of positivity, desirability, 
and pleasantness of the situations), clarity (realistic, clear, and understandable), feedback 
fairness (responsibility, intentionality, and deservingness), honor threat perception (threat 
to reputation, others’ respect, value in the society, status in the society, self-worth, and 
confidence), negative emotions (humiliated, offended, criticized, ashamed, guilty, and 
angry) and positive emotions (attentive, alert, and calm; Appendix C for data). Sample 
sizes were too small for statistical tests to be reliable. Therefore, I examined the 
descriptive statistics and chose four scenarios (two from university and two from work 
place scenarios) which met the following criteria best: 1) True accusation, negative 
performance feedback, and false accusation conditions were perceived as similar in 
valence but the neutral feedback condition was perceived more positively than the other 
versions in both cultures. 2) The clarity across the threat conditions of the scenarios were 
more similar and the ratings were higher than of other scenarios. 3) The feedback that the 
target received in the true accusation condition of the scenarios was perceived similarly 
deserved to the negative performance feedback condition but more deserved than neutral 
feedback and especially false accusation conditions (least deserved). 4) True and false 
accusation conditions were perceived more honor threatening than negative performance 
feedback and neutral feedback conditions in Turkey. In northern US, however, true 
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accusation and negative performance feedback conditions were perceived as more honor 
threatening than false accusation and neutral feedback conditions. 5) True and false 
accusation conditions evoked stronger negative emotions than the negative performance 
feedback and neutral feedback conditions in Turkey. In northern US, however, true 
accusation and negative performance feedback conditions evoked stronger negative 
emotions than false accusation and neutral feedback conditions. 6) There were no large 
differences for positive emotions across threat conditions of the selected scenarios 




CHAPTER 3. EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Participants  
Participants were undergraduate students at Iowa State University in northern US 
(n = 318, 155 women) and at Sabanci University in Turkey (n = 206, 100 women), who 
did not take part in the pilot study (see Appendix A for the Institutional Review Board 
approval). They received course credit for participation. The northern American sample 
consisted of 233 European-American, 23 African-American, 15 Latino/a, 17 Asian-
American, 12 multiracial American, four Native American, and 14 international students. 
Only European-American participants were included in the analyses. I also asked 
participants where they spent most of their lives and excluded those from the US sample 
who lived in an honor state (e.g., Texas) or who failed to provide that information (8 
participants). Moreover, nine participants in northern US and four participants in Turkey 
indicated that they had participated in a study that measured similar constructs and 
therefore were excluded from the analyses.1  
The final sample consisted of 202 participants (98 women) in Turkey and 216 
participants (99 women) in northern US. Average age was 22.12 in Turkey (SD = 1.59) 
and 19.25 (SD = 1.52) in northern US. I imputed mean values for missing data on age, 
upbringing, and SES based on the culture and gender of the participant. A t-test revealed 
that Turkish participants were significantly older than northern American participants, t 
                                                          
1 I included four questions in the survey that asked participants to select a certain number 
on the scale to measure how carefully they read the questions. I compared the responses 
of participants who did not make any mistakes, who made one mistake, two mistakes, 
three mistakes, and four mistakes. I focused on shame, humiliation-related emotions, and 
anger-related emotions and did not find substantial differences in the patterns. Therefore, 
I included all participants in the analyses regardless of the number of mistakes they made. 
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(416) = 18.83, p < .001, d = 1.85. Moreover, Turkish participants had significantly higher 
SES and more urban upbringing (MSES = 6.58, SD = 1.05, MUpbringing = 7.27, SD = 1.57) 
than northern American participants (MSES = 5.60, SD = 1.25, MUpbringing = 4.88, SD = 
2.06), tSES (348) = 8.63, p < .001, d = .85, tUpbringing (416) = 13.40, p < .001, d = 1.30. 
These variables are controlled in the analyses because they differed across the two 
cultural groups and for the following reasons: Upbringing tends to be controlled in studies 
examining honor cultures because people who are brought up in rural areas tend to put 
stronger emphasis on honor values than those in urban areas (Barnes, Brown, & 
Tamborski, 2012). I controlled SES because research shows that social class plays an 
important role in shaping behaviors (e.g., Lareau, 2003). Americans who belong to the 
working class, for example, tend to be more interdependent and to put more emphasis on 
fitting in compared to middle class Americans (e.g., Stephens, Markus, & Townsend, 
2007). Bivariate correlations of age, upbringing, and SES with the outcome variables are 
reported in Appendix D.   
Design  
The experiment was conducted as a between-subjects design. Participants from 
Turkey and northern US were randomly assigned to one of the four threat conditions (true 
accusation, negative performance feedback, false accusation, or neutral feedback). 
Materials and Procedure 
The experiment was conducted online (Qualtrics) and presented as a study on 
situations and values. Participants read two scenarios in each threat condition, one of 
which took place in a university setting and the second in a work place setting (Appendix 
B). The order of scenarios was randomized. Participants were asked to imagine 
themselves as the target of the scenarios as vividly as possible, even if the situation was 
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something they would not encounter in their life. They summarized the scenario in their 
own words and indicated how they would feel and respond to the situation. The purpose 
of this part was to make sure that participants paid attention to the scenarios, thought hard 
about the conflict, and experienced them vividly. After that they answered the questions 
described below.  
Manipulation check questions. Participants answered several questions to test 
whether the manipulations worked. They indicated their answers on a scale of 1 (not at 
all) to 7 (extremely). First, they evaluated the valence of the scenarios by rating how 
positive, desirable, and pleasant each situation was. For reputation threat manipulation, 
they indicated to what degree their reputation would be threatened if they were the target 
in the scenario. Finally, for the deservingness manipulation they indicated to what degree 
they deserved the accusation/feedback as the target in the scenario. 
Emotional responses. Next, they completed an emotion scale, in which they 
indicated to what degree they would feel belittled, humiliated, offended, criticized, 
threatened, ashamed, embarrassed, guilty, angry, hostile, outraged, furious, enthusiastic, 
excited, alert, strong, proud, attentive, calm, and peaceful  (in randomized order; taken 
from Cross, Uskul & Wasti, 2014; Kitayama et al., 2009; Uskul et al.’s, 2014). Even 
though I was only interested in the negative emotions, I also assessed positive emotions to 
have a baseline level and to disguise the real purpose of the study.  
The reliability analysis for negative and positive emotions showed that 
Cronbach’s alphas were sufficiently high in Turkey (.91 and .87) and in northern US (.93 
and .87) for these scales. Moreover, I examined humiliation-related emotions (humiliated, 
belittled, offended, threatened, and criticized) and anger-related emotions (angry, hostile, 
outraged, and furious) separately. Cronbach’s alphas were sufficiently high for these two 
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scales as well, namely, .90 for humiliation-related emotions in both cultures and .91 and 
.95 for anger-related emotions in Turkey and northern US, respectively. I calculated the 
average ratings for these emotions for my analyses. 
Behavioral preferences. Next, participants indicated how they would 
behaviorally respond to the accuser/feedback provider in the scenario by using a scale 
adopted from previous conflict research (e.g., De Dreu et al., 2001; Rodriguez-Mosquera 
et al., 2008; Schönbach, 1980; Shapiro & Kulik, 2004). Participants reported their 
willingness to choose competitive responses in the form of retaliation, disapproval, 
justification, and passive-aggressive behaviors, their willingness to avoid the offender or 
to find excuses for their behavior, and their willingness to choose cooperative responses 
such as apologizing, finding a middle way, or consulting a third party (Table 1). They 
used a scale from 1 (not willing at all) to 7 (extremely willing) to indicate their 
willingness. The items were presented in a randomized order.  
Cronbach’s alphas for competitive and cooperative responses were sufficiently 
high, namely .84 and .86 in Turkey and .88 and .84 in northern US, respectively. 
Cronbach’s alpha for the avoidant response scale was .68 in Turkey and .69 in northern 
US. Neither in Turkey nor in northern US there was an item that would increase the 
Cronbach’s alpha above .70 after deletion. Therefore, results for the avoidant response 
scale were interpreted with caution. Moreover, I examined indirect cooperative responses 
(i.e., consulting third party). The two items in that category were “I would tell another 
person, who was not involved, what happened and ask for opinion” and “I would ask a 
senior person to intervene.”  In both cultures, the two items had a significantly positive 
correlation, rTR = .45 and rUS = .56, ps < .001. I also tested whether the specific, most 
extreme competitive and cooperative responses, namely, retaliation and apologizing, 
would show a similar pattern as the aggregate response categories. Reliability analyses 
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for retaliation and apology behaviors revealed sufficiently high Cronbach’s alphas, 
namely .83 and .95 in Turkey and .79 and .94 in northern US, respectively. I calculated 
the average ratings for these behaviors for my analyses. 
Approval of behaviors by others. Sometimes perceptions of social norms 
influence behaviors more than individuals’ own beliefs or attitudes (Chiu, Gelfand, 
Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010; Wan, Torelli, & Chiu, 2010; Zou, Tam, Morris, 
Lee, Lau, & Chiu, 2009). Therefore, in this study, I also examined the socially 
constructed norms about conflict management by asking participants to rate the extent to 
which others in their society would approve each response type. Thereby, a potential 
social desirability problem was overcome as well. Participants were asked to rate the 
extent to which others in their society would approve each response type using a scale 
from 1 (would definitely not approve) to 7 (would definitely approve). The items were 
presented in a randomized order. Cronbach’s alphas for the perceived approval of 
competitive and cooperative responses were sufficiently high, namely .90 and .88 in 
Turkey and .91 and .85 in northern US, respectively. Unlike the personal preference of 
avoidant responses, Cronbach’s alpha for the perceived approval of avoidant responses by 
others was also sufficiently high in both cultures, namely, .79 in Turkey and .71 in 
northern US. Similar to the personal behavior preference part, I examined the approval of 
indirect cooperative responses (i.e., consulting third party). In both cultures, the two items 
had a significantly positive correlation, rTR = .52 and rUS = .57, ps < .001. Finally, I 
examined the perceived approval of retaliation and apology behaviors. Cronbach’s alphas 
were sufficiently high for these variables as well, namely, .86 and .94 in Turkey and .82 
and .91 in northern US for retaliation and apology, respectively. I calculated the average 
ratings for the approval of these behaviors for my analyses. After completing the approval 
of behaviors part, participants read the debriefing information.  
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I did not counterbalance the order of self-preference and approval by others 
questions for the sake of simplicity. I was more interested in cultural differences in each 
perspective (self and others) than the difference between these perspectives in each 
culture.   
Scenario Comparisons 
To decide whether there were differences across the four scenarios I conducted 
reliability analyses for the manipulation check items – deservingness (“As the target in 
the situation, how much did you deserve the comment?”), reputation threat (“As the target 
in the situation, to what degree was your reputation threatened?”), and valence (“How 
negative/undesirable/unpleasant or positive/desirable/pleasant was the situation described 
in the scenario?”). These three variables or scales consisted of four items/scenarios, 
namely, cheating on a test, stealing money, plagiarism at work, and missing a meeting. 
Cronbach’s alphas were .75 and .80 for deservingness, .67 and .75 for reputation threat, 
and .92 and .90 for valence in Turkey and northern US, respectively. I concluded that the 
scenarios fit well together and calculated their average for all variables in my analyses.  
Results 
To overcome Type 1 error, Bonferroni correction was applied to all analyses in 
this experiment. I conducted the analyses with and without gender and reported the 
effects of gender in the footnotes only if they were significant. Sample sizes may differ 
across analyses due to missing data in the outcome variables.  
Manipulation Check  
To understand whether my manipulations worked, I conducted univariate 
ANCOVAs for each manipulation check variable, in which I entered culture (Turkey and 
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northern US) and threat condition (true accusation, negative performance feedback, false 
accusation, and neutral feedback) as between-subjects factors, and age, upbringing, and 
SES as control variables. For the sake of brevity, I reported the main and interaction 
effects of culture and threat condition only in Table 3. Univariate ANCOVAs that were 
conducted separately for each culture and threat condition as well as specific pairwise 
comparisons are reported in the text.  
Deservingness. In both cultures, there was a significant main effect of threat 
condition, FTurkey(3, 195) = 109.43, p < .001, η2 = .63, and FUS (3, 209) = 108.51, p < 
.001, η2 = .61. As expected, participants in the true accusation condition perceived the 
treatment of the target as significantly more deserved than participants in all other 
conditions, ps < .01, ds > .81. Negative performance feedback and neutral feedback 
scenarios were the second highest in deservingness ratings but they did not differ from 
each other, ps > .84, ds < .26. As expected, participants in the false accusation condition 
perceived the treatment of the target as significantly less deserved than participants in all 
other conditions, ps < .001, ds > 2.20 (see Table 4 for descriptives).2 
Reputation threat. In both cultures, there was a significant main effect of threat 
condition, FTurkey(3, 195) = 74.76, p < .001, η2 = .54, and FUS (3, 209) = 87.74, p < .001, 
η2 = .56. Participants who read the true accusation and false accusation scenarios 
perceived greater reputation threat than those who read the negative performance 
feedback and neutral feedback scenarios, ps < .001, ds > .79. Participants in the true and 
false accusation conditions did not significantly differ from each other, ps > .06, ds < .47. 
                                                          
2 There was a significant interaction of gender and culture for the deservingness variable, 
F (1, 399) = 4.10, p < .05, η2 = .01. Turkish men (M = 4.47, SD = 1.90) perceived the 
treatment of the target significantly more deserved than Turkish women (M = 4.23, SD = 
2.01), F (1, 191) = 6.37, p < .05, d = .12. There was no gender difference in northern US, 
F (1, 205) = .19, p = .67. 
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Participants who read the negative performance feedback scenarios perceived the 
situation significantly more threatening than those who read the neutral feedback 
scenarios, ps < .001, ds > 1.48 (see Table 4 for descriptives). 
Valence. In both cultures, there was a significant main effect of threat condition, 
FTurkey(3, 195) = 232.33, p < .001, η2 = .78, and FUS(3, 209) = 239.68, p < .001, η2 = .78. 
Turkish participants who read the true accusation and false accusation scenarios did not 
differ in their valence evaluation of the situations, p = 1.00, d = .30, but they perceived 
the situations in these scenarios as more negative than those who read the negative 
performance feedback and neutral feedback scenarios, ps < .05, ds > .58. Turkish 
participants who read the negative performance feedback scenarios perceived the 
situation as more negative than those who read the neutral feedback scenarios, p < .001, d 
= 3.39. As expected, northern Americans who read the true accusation, false accusation, 
and negative performance feedback scenarios did not differ from each other in their 
valence evaluations of the situations, ps = 1.00, ds < .24, but they perceived the situations 
in these scenarios as more negative than those who read the neutral feedback scenarios, ps 
< .001, ds > 4.09 (Table 4). Based on these results, I concluded that manipulations 
worked well in both cultural groups.   
Main Analyses of Emotional Responses  
I conducted separate univariate ANCOVAs for aggregate negative and positive 
emotions as well as for shame, humiliation-related emotions, and anger. I entered culture 
(Turkey and northern US) and threat condition (true accusation, negative performance 
feedback, false accusation, and neutral feedback) as between-subjects factors, and age, 
upbringing, and SES as control variables. Main effects and interaction effects of culture 
and threat condition are reported in Table 3. Univariate ANCOVAs that were conducted 
37 
 
separately for each culture and threat condition as well as specific pairwise comparisons 
are reported in the text.  
Cross-cultural comparison of negative and positive emotions. I hypothesized 
that Turkish participants who read the true accusation scenarios and imagined themselves 
as the target would be more likely to indicate that they would experience negative 
emotions compared to northern American participants (Hypothesis 1a). Contrary to my 
expectations, the univariate ANCOVA in the true accusation condition revealed that 
participants from the two cultural groups were similar in their likelihood to experience 
negative emotions when they imagined themselves as the target in the true accusation 
scenarios, F (1, 100) = .38, p = .54, d = .15 (see Table 5 for descriptives).3 
I did not predict any cultural differences for the likelihood to experience positive 
emotions (e.g., excited, strong; Hypothesis 1b). As expected, there was not a significant 
main effect or interaction effect of culture for positive emotions, ps > .55 (Table 5).4  
Within-culture comparison of specific negative emotions. I also examined 
within-culture patterns of negative emotions to overcome the potential issues with cross-
cultural comparison of the means, such as reference group effects mentioned earlier. I 
was interested in specific negative emotions that were particularly relevant to the honor 
concept, such as shame, guilt, humiliation-related emotions (e.g., feeling humiliated, 
belittled), and anger-related emotions (e.g., angry, hostile).  
                                                          
3 There was a significant interaction of gender and threat condition for negative emotions, 
F (3, 399) = 3.55, p < .05, η2 = .03. In the negative performance feedback condition, 
women (M = 4.06, SD = .94) were significantly more likely to report negative emotions 
than men (M = 3.64, SD = 1.04), F (1, 102) = 7.67, p < .01, d = .24. 
4 Men (M = 3.11, SD = 1.19) were more likely to indicate that they would feel positive 
emotions as the target in the scenario compared to women (M = 2.83, SD = 1.18), F (1, 
397) = 7.69, p < .01, d = .29. 
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Shame and humiliation-related emotions (e.g., humiliated, belittled). Due to the 
importance of honor values in Turkey and the intensity of honor threat caused by a 
rightful accusation of a transgression, I expected Turkish participants in the true 
accusation condition to be most likely to indicate that they would experience shame and 
humiliation-related emotions compared to Turkish participants in other conditions. Due to 
the emphasis on achievements and positive self-esteem in northern US, however, I 
expected Northern American participants in the true accusation and negative performance 
feedback conditions to indicate that they would experience these emotions at a similar 
level (Hypothesis 1c).  
Univariate ANCOVAs for shame showed a significant main effect of threat 
condition in Turkey, F (3, 195) = 74.11, p < .001, η2 = .53, and in northern US, F (3, 209) 
= 99.50, p < .001, η2 = .59. As expected, Turkish participants in the true accusation 
condition were more likely to indicate that they would experience shame compared to 
those in other conditions, ps < .001, ds > 1.13. Contrary to my expectations, however, 
northern Americans in the negative performance feedback condition were less likely to 
indicate that they would experience shame compared to those in the true accusation 
condition, p < .01, d = .72, but more likely to indicate that they would experience shame 
compared to those in the remaining conditions, ps < .001, ds > 1.22 (Table 5).5  
                                                          
5 Women (M = 4.30, SD = 2.19) were more likely to indicate that they would feel 
ashamed if they were the target in the scenario compared to men (M = 3.82, SD = 1.98), F 
(1, 399) = 11.90, p < .01, d = .23. There was also a significant interaction of gender and 
threat condition for shame, F (3, 399) = 4.99, p < .01, η2 = .03. Separate univariate 
ANCOVAs for each threat condition revealed that women who read the true accusation 
(M = 6.31, SD = .90) and negative feedback scenarios (M = 5.37, SD = 1.37) were more 
likely to indicate that they would feel ashamed compared to men in these conditions 
(MTrue = 5.82, SD = 1.29, MNegative = 4.32, SD = 1.58), FTrue(1, 98) = 6.28, p < .05, d = .44, 




Univariate ANCOVAs for humiliation-related emotions also showed a significant 
main effect of threat condition in Turkey, F (3, 194) = 60.97, p < .001, η2 = .49, and in 
northern US, F (3, 209) = 94.36, p < .001, η2 = .58. Partially in line with expectations, 
Turkish participants in the true accusation condition were more likely to indicate that they 
would experience humiliation-related emotions compared to those in other conditions, ps 
< .001, ds > .80, but similarly likely to indicate that they would experience humiliation-
related emotions compared to those in the false accusation condition, p = 1.00, d = .21. 
This result suggests that in Turkey, people who are rightfully accused of a transgression 
feel as humiliated as those who were falsely accused of a transgression. In line with 
expectations, Northern American participants in the negative performance feedback 
condition were similarly likely to indicate that they would experience humiliation-related 
emotions compared to those in the true accusation condition, p = .40, d = .32, and more 
likely than those in the neutral feedback condition, p < .001, d = 1.94, Northern American 
participants in the false accusation condition were more likely to indicate that they would 
experience humiliation-related emotions compared to northern Americans in the negative 
performance feedback condition, p < .001, d = 1.22 (Table 5).  
Shame versus guilt. I predicted that Turkish participants who read the true 
accusation scenarios would indicate that they would experience more shame than guilt, 
whereas for northern Americans the pattern would be the opposite (Hypothesis 1d). 
Different from the analyses in this section, I conducted a repeated measures ANCOVA 
for the true accusation condition, in which emotion type (shame vs guilt) was the within-
subjects variable, culture was the between-subjects variable, and age, upbringing, and 
SES were covariates. Results revealed that participants from both cultural groups were 
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similarly likely to indicate that they would experience shame and guilt, indicated by a 
non-significant culture and emotion type interaction, F (1, 99) = .00, p = .96 (Table 5).6 
Anger-related emotions (e.g., angry, hostile). I predicted that participants in both 
cultures who read the false accusation scenarios would be most likely to indicate that they 
would experience anger-related emotions compared to those in other conditions, because 
they do not deserve the accusation. I also expected Turkish participants in the true 
accusation condition to be more likely to indicate that they would experience anger-
related emotions compared to Turkish participants in the remaining conditions. In 
northern US, however, participants in the true accusation and negative performance 
feedback conditions were expected to indicate that they would experience anger-related 
emotions at a similar level (Hypothesis 1e). In Turkey, people who are rightfully called 
out for a transgression may feel strong reputation threat and anger. In northern US, 
however, a threat to positive self-esteem through negative performance feedback may 
have the same effect because of the importance of the construct in that cultural group.  
Univariate ANCOVAs showed a significant main effect of threat condition in 
Turkey, F (3, 195) = 56.27, p < .001, η2 = .46, and in northern US, F (3, 209) = 92.88, p < 
.001, η2 = .57. As expected, participants in both cultures who were in the false accusation 
condition were most likely to indicate that they would experience anger-related emotions 
compared to those in other conditions, ps < .001, ds > .98. In line with my expectations, 
                                                          
6 There was a significant interaction of gender and threat condition for guilt, F (3, 397) = 
6.57, p < .001, η2 = .05. Separate univariate ANCOVAs for each threat condition revealed 
that women who read the true accusation (M = 6.35, SD = .90) and negative feedback 
scenarios (M = 5.49, SD = 1.27) were more likely to indicate that they would feel guilty 
compared to men in these conditions (MTrue = 5.87, SD = 1.17, MNegative = 4.62, SD = 
1.58), FTrue(1, 97) = 6.97, p < .05, d = .46, FNegative(1, 102) = 10.15, p < .01, d = .61. 
Women (M = 1.61, SD = .95) who were in the neutral feedback condition, however, were 
less likely to report guilt compared to men in this condition (M = 2.21, SD = 1.30), F (1, 




Turkish participants in the true accusation condition were more likely to indicate that they 
would experience anger-related emotions compared to those in the remaining conditions, 
ps < .01, ds > .55. As expected, northern American participants in the negative 
performance feedback and true accusation conditions were similarly likely to indicate that 
they would experience anger-related emotions, p = 1.00, d = .06, and more likely than 
those in the neutral feedback condition, ps < .001, ds > 1.64 (Table 5). 
Summary. Participants in the two cultures were similarly likely to indicate that 
they would experience negative emotions when they imagined themselves as the 
rightfully accused target in the scenario. In both cultures, participants in the true 
accusation condition were most likely to indicate that they would feel ashamed compared 
to participants in other conditions. For Turkish participants, a rightful accusation - even 
though deserved - was perceived as equally humiliating as a false accusation. For 
northern Americans, there was no difference in humiliation-related emotions between 
those who read the true accusation and negative performance feedback scenarios. This 
suggests that a threat to self-respect through negative performance feedback in northern 
US is perceived as similarly humiliating as a complete honor threat through a rightful 
accusation. Finally, participants from both cultures in the false accusation condition were 
most likely to indicate that they would experience anger-related emotions compared to 
those in other conditions. In Turkey, participants in the true accusation condition were 
more likely to indicate that they would experience anger compared to those in the 
negative performance feedback condition, whereas for northern Americans there was no 
difference between these two conditions. This suggests that for northern Americans a 
threat to self-respect (negative performance feedback) may be equally anger-provoking to 




Main Analyses of Behavioral Preferences 
I conducted separate univariate ANCOVAs for competitive, cooperative, and 
avoidant responses. I entered culture (Turkey and northern US) and threat condition (true 
accusation, negative performance feedback, false accusation, and neutral feedback) as 
between-subjects factors, and age, upbringing, and SES as control variables. Main effects 
and interaction effects of culture and threat condition are reported in Table 3. Univariate 
ANCOVAs that were conducted separately for each culture and threat condition as well 
as specific pairwise comparisons are reported in the text.  
Cross-cultural comparison of competitive, cooperative, and avoidant 
responses. I expected that Turkish participants who read the true accusation scenarios 
and imagined themselves as the target would be more willing to choose competitive 
responses (e.g., justification) but less willing to choose cooperative responses (e.g., 
apologies) compared to northern Americans (Hypothesis 2a). Contrary to my predictions, 
univariate ANCOVAs in each condition revealed that participants in the two cultural 
groups were similarly willing to choose competitive responses in the true accusation 
condition, F (1, 99) = .02, p = .90, d = .05. Similarly, there was no significant difference 
between the two cultures for cooperative responses in this condition, F (1, 99) = 1.41, p = 
.24, d = .09 (Table 6).7 
                                                          
7 Men (M = 2.68, SD = 1.02) were more likely to indicate that they would choose 
competitive responses compared to women (M = 2.45, SD = .96), F (1, 395) = 5.25, p < 
.05, d = .23. There was also a significant interaction of gender and threat condition for 
cooperative responses, F (3, 395) = 4.58, p < .01, η2 = .03. Separate univariate 
ANCOVAs for each threat condition revealed that women who read the negative 
performance feedback scenarios (M = 5.02, SD = .93) were more likely to indicate that 
they would choose cooperative responses compared to men in the same condition (M = 




For negative performance feedback scenarios, I expected Turkish participants to 
be more willing to choose avoidant and indirect cooperative responses (i.e., consulting 
third party) compared to northern Americans (Hypothesis 2b). Contrary to my 
predictions, univariate ANCOVAs did not reveal a significant difference between the two 
cultures for avoidance, F (1, 104) = 1.01, p = .32, d = .36, or indirect cooperative 
responses, F (1, 104) = 1.98, p = .16, d = .01 (Table 6). 
Within-culture comparison of competitive and cooperative responses. As in 
the emotion section, I made within-culture comparisons of behavioral preferences across 
threat conditions. I expected that in both cultures, participants who read the false 
accusation scenarios would be most willing to choose competitive but least willing to 
choose cooperative responses as the target in the scenarios, compared to participants who 
read other scenarios. Moreover, Turkish participants in the true accusation condition 
would be more willing to choose competitive but less willing to choose cooperative 
responses compared to those in the remaining conditions. In northern US, however, 
participants in true accusation and negative performance feedback conditions would be 
similarly willing to choose competitive and cooperative responses (Hypothesis 2c).  
The univariate ANCOVAs revealed a significant main effect of threat condition 
for competitive responses in Turkey, F (3, 191) = 16.69, p < .001, η2 = .21, and in 
northern US, F (3, 209) = 13.71, p < .001, η2 = .16. As expected, participants in both 
cultures who were in the false accusation condition were most willing to choose 
competitive responses compared to those in other conditions, ps < .01, ds > .83. Contrary 
to my predictions Turkish participants in the true accusation were similarly willing to 
choose competitive responses compared to those in the negative performance feedback 
and neutral feedback conditions, ps > .99, ds < .37. Partially in line with my expectations, 
this was the case for northern American participants as well, ps > .99, ds < .16 (Table 6).  
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Similar to competitive responses, there was a significant main effect of threat 
condition for cooperative responses in Turkey, F (3, 191) = 41.37, p < .001, η2 = .39, and 
in northern US, F (3, 209) = 44.59, p < .001, η2 = .39. As expected, participants in both 
cultures who were in the false accusation condition were least willing to choose 
cooperative responses compared to those in true accusation and negative performance 
feedback conditions, ps < .001, ds > 1.72, but they were not different from those in the 
neutral feedback condition, ps > .09, ds < .54. Contrary to my predictions, Turkish 
participants in the true accusation condition were similarly willing to choose cooperative 
responses compared to those in the negative performance feedback condition, p = 1.00, d 
= .05, and more willing than those in the neutral feedback condition, p < .001, d = 1.14. In 
line with my expectations, northern American participants in the true accusation condition 
were similarly willing to choose cooperative responses compared to those in the negative 
feedback condition, p = 1.00, d = .08, but more willing than those in the neutral feedback 
condition, p < .001, d = 1.56 (Table 6). 
Within-culture comparison of specific behaviors. I also examined specific and 
most extreme competitive and cooperative behaviors, namely, retaliation and apology 
behaviors. Results were similar to the patterns of the aggregate competitive and 
cooperative responses. Univariate ANCOVAs for retaliation showed a significant main 
effect of threat condition in Turkey, F (3, 191) = 18.92, p < .001, η2 = .23, and in northern 
US, F (3, 209) = 13.74, p < .001, η2 = .17. As expected, participants in both cultures who 
were in the false accusation condition were most willing to retaliate compared to those in 
other conditions, ps < .01, ds > .65. Contrary to expectations, Turkish participants who 
were in the true accusation condition were similarly willing to retaliate compared to those 
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in the remaining conditions, ps > .44, ds < .33. In line with my predictions, this was the 
case for northern American participants as well, ps > .62, ds < .31 (Table 6).8 
Similar to retaliation, there was a significant main effect of threat condition for 
apology behavior in Turkey, F (3, 191) = 70.19, p < .001, η2 = .52, and in northern US, F 
(3, 209) = 77.66, p < .001, η2 = .53. As expected, participants in both cultures who were 
in the false accusation condition were least willing to apologize compared to those in the 
true accusation and negative feedback conditions, ps < .001, ds > 2.11. In Turkey, 
participants who were in the false accusation condition were significantly less willing to 
choose to apologize compared to those in the neutral feedback condition, p < .001, d = 
.95, but the difference between these conditions was marginally significant for northern 
Americans, p = .06, d = .50. Contrary to my predictions, Turkish participants who were in 
the true accusation condition were similarly willing to apologize compared to those in the 
negative performance feedback condition, p = 1.00, d = .16, and more willing to 
apologize than those in the neutral feedback condition, p < .001, d = 1.52. In line with my 
predictions, this was the case for northern American participants as well, p = 1.00, d = 
.13, and p < .001, d = 1.97 (Table 6).9 
                                                          
8 Men (M = 2.42, SD = 1.34) were more likely to indicate that they would choose 
retaliation compared to women (M = 2.02, SD = 1.09), F (1, 395) = 12.33, p < .001, d = 
.33. There was also a significant interaction of gender, culture, and threat condition for 
retaliation behavior, F (3, 395) = 2.82, p < .05, η2 = .02. Separate univariate ANCOVAs 
for each culture and condition revealed a significant gender difference only for Turkish 
participants in the false accusation condition, F (1, 41) = 10.47, p < .01, d = 1.05. Turkish 
men (M = 4.04, SD = 1.29) were more likely to indicate that they would choose retaliation 
if they imagined themselves as the falsely accused target in the scenario compared to 
Turkish women, (M = 2.76, SD = 1.15). 
9 There was a significant interaction of gender and threat condition for apology behavior, 
F (3, 395) = 4.28, p < .01, η2 = .03. Separate univariate ANCOVAs for each condition 
showed that women (M = 5.42, SD = 1.04) were significantly more likely to indicate that 
they would apologize if they received negative performance feedback compared to men 
(M = 4.93, SD = 1.28), F (1, 102) = 4.80, p < .05, d = .42. 
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Approval of Behaviors by Others 
Participants not only evaluated their own preference for each behavioral response 
to threats but also others’ approval of these responses. I tested the same behavioral 
hypotheses by replacing the outcome measures with participants’ perceived approval of 
these behaviors by others in their society. Results were very similar to those for the 
personal preference of the behaviors and are reported in Table 3 and Table 7.  
Summary. There were no cross-cultural differences in the likelihood to choose 
competitive, cooperative, or avoidant behaviors for participants who read the true 
accusation scenarios. In both cultures, participants who read the false accusation 
scenarios were most likely to indicate that they would choose competitive responses but 
least likely to indicate that they would choose cooperative responses. Moreover, in both 
cultures, participants in the true accusation and negative performance feedback conditions 
were similarly likely to choose these responses. The examination of specific responses, 
such as retaliation and apology, as well as the examination of the perceived approval of 
these responses revealed similar results.  
The lack of support for most of my predictions in behavioral responses to conflict 
could be due to social desirability concerns. Participants may feel comfortable to report 
their emotions in response to the conflict scenarios, but when it comes to behaviors, they 
may be concerned about giving the socially appropriate answer. Moreover, these 
scenarios are about hypothetical situations and may not evoke actual emotions and 
behaviors. In Experiment 2, I tried to overcome this issue by conducting a laboratory 





CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENT 2 
Method 
This experiment improved on Experiment 1 by providing actual behavioral 
evidence of retaliation and apologies in response to conflicts. In a laboratory setting, I 
examined cultural differences in emotional and behavioral responses after real conflicts 
related to threats such as true accusations and negative performance feedback. 
Participants were enticed to cheat or not by a confederate and were accused or received 
negative feedback by the experimenter afterwards (adapted from a paradigm developed 
by Russano, Meissner, Narchet, & Kassin, 2005, and Scherr & Madon, 2012). I focused 
on self-reported emotional responses to these threats and on how participants perceived 
faces that displayed various emotions. Moreover, participants responded to threats by 
writing an essay and playing a bargaining game (ultimatum game) that indirectly 
measured their likelihood to retaliate against the threat source (i.e., the experimenter). 
They also evaluated the threat source (i.e., the experimenter) on various dimensions, such 
as competence and helpfulness, as a measure of defensiveness. Employing multiple 
measures to examine actual emotions and behaviors, this experiment was a strong test of 
my predictions.  
Participants  
Participants were undergraduate students at Iowa State University in northern US 
(n = 245, 144 women) and at Bogazici University in Turkey (n = 213, 133 women), who 
did not take part in the pilot study or Experiment 1 (online scenario study; see Appendix 
A for the Institutional Review Board approval). They received course credit and $8 for 
their participation. The northern American sample consisted of 199 European-American, 
17 African-American, 8 Latino/a, 14 Asian-American, 3 multiracial American, and 2 
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international students. Only European-American participants were included in the 
analyses. I also asked participants where they spent most of their lives and excluded those 
from the US sample who lived in an honor state (e.g., Texas; 23 participants). Another 
exclusion criterion was participants’ suspicion level. At the end of each session, before 
debriefing, the experimenter asked questions such as “In your own words, what do you 
think is the purpose of this study?” The experimenter assigned a suspicion score based on 
the participants’ answers to these questions. In Turkey, 11 participants (5.2 %), in 
northern US, 10 participants (5.3 %) were excluded from the analyses because they were 
aware of the purpose of the experiment (e.g., they said that the experiment measured 
whether participants would give the experimenter more money because they felt guilty). 
There were participants who were somewhat suspicious (e.g., who said that the 
experiment measured how people react to feedback). Analyses comparing these 
participants with non-suspicious participants did not reveal any meaningful differences 
between the two groups across cultures and threat conditions. Therefore, I decided to 
collapse these two groups.10 
The final sample consisted of 202 participants (128 women) in Turkey and 177 
participants (107 women) in northern US. Average age was 20.98 (SD = 1.81) in Turkey 
and 19.82 (SD = 1.59) in northern US. A t-test revealed that Turkish participants were 
significantly older than northern American participants, t (376) = 6.64, p < .001, d = .68. 
Moreover, Turkish participants had significantly lower SES but more urban upbringing 
                                                          
10 I conducted t-tests for manipulation check questions and emotion scales comparing 
non-suspicious and somewhat suspicious participants in each culture and threat condition. 
There was only one significant difference in the Turkish sample for the false accusation 
condition and three marginally significant differences in northern US for true and false 
accusation conditions.  
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(MSES = 5.35, SD = 1.13, MUpbringing = 6.70, SD = 1.57) than northern American 
participants (MSES = 5.85, SD = 1.21, MUpbringing = 5.25, SD = 1.95), tSES (376) = 4.11,  
p < .001, d = .43, tUpbringing (376) = 7.89, p < .001, d = .82. As in Experiment 1, these 
variables are controlled in the analyses. Bivariate correlations of age, upbringing, and 
SES with the outcome variables are reported in Appendix D.   
Design 
The experiment was conducted as a between-subjects design. Participants from 
Turkey and northern US were randomly assigned to one of the four threat conditions (true 
accusation, negative performance feedback, false accusation, or neutral feedback). 
Materials and Procedure 
Upon arrival to the lab, the participant and the confederate received information 
about the aim and structure of the study. The experiment was presented as if it was 
examining the relation of teamwork, cognition, and decision making, and as if it was 
managed by faculty in the Department of Psychology and the Department of Economics. 
First, the participant and the confederate were asked to fill out a questionnaire on 
MediaLab, which included demographic questions (Appendix E). After that the 
experimenter led the participant and the confederate to a cubicle, where they got to know 
each other for a little bit and then started working on individual and team logic problems 
(Appendix E).  
Logic problems. The participant and the confederate were not allowed to talk 
during the individual logic problems but they were expected to work together on the team 
problems. They started with the first individual problem and then moved on to the first 
team problem. They followed this alternating pattern until they were finished with all of 
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the problems (four in total). The experimenter left the cubicle after giving the 
instructions. If the participant was in the true accusation condition, the confederate tried 
to convince the participant to cheat by asking what he/she found in one of the individual 
logic problems. If the participant was in the false accusation, negative performance 
feedback, or neutral feedback conditions, the confederate did not say anything during the 
individual logic problems. It is important to note that the confederate and the 
experimenter were blind to each other’s conditions. The confederate did not know what 
type of feedback the participant was going to receive from the experimenter later on. 
Similarly, the experimenter did not know whether the confederate tried to convince the 
participant to cheat during the logic problem part and whether the participant has actually 
cheated or not. 
Once the participant and the confederate were finished with the logic problems, 
the experimenter went back to the cubicle and asked them to fill out a short survey about 
teamwork and self-evaluation so that he/she had time to score the logic problems 
(Appendix E). The survey consisted of questions such as “How much did you contribute 
to the team logic problems?” or “How would you rate your team’s ability to work well 
together?” The confederate let the experimenter know when they were finished with this 
survey.  
Threat manipulation. If the participant was in the true accusation, negative 
performance feedback, or false accusation condition the experimenter went back to the 
cubicle and told the participant and the confederate that there might be a problem. The 
experimenter then asked the confederate to follow him/her to the other cubicle so that 
they could talk and let the participant know that he/she was going to be back to talk with 
the participant as well. In the no threat condition, the experimenter said that they were 
ready to move on to the next task, on which they were going to work separately. 
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Similarly, the experimenter asked the confederate to follow him/her to the other cubicle to 
set him/her up and told the participant that he/she was going to be back in a bit. In all 
conditions, threat manipulation was delivered in private.  
After three minutes, the experimenter went back to the participant’s cubicle with a 
blank sheet of paper. In the true accusation and false accusation conditions, the 
experimenter said that while scoring their problems, he/she realized that the two of them 
shared answers on one of the individual logic problems. He/she did not know how to 
handle this situation and called the professor in charge to find out what to do. The 
professor said that she will consider this a case of cheating and asked him/her to 
document what happened. The experimenter then gave the participant a sheet of paper to 
write down what happened and whatever he/she would like to say.  
In the negative performance feedback condition, the experimenter said that the 
participant performed very poorly on the individual logic problems and he/she called the 
professor to find out what to say to the participant, without giving the participant’s name 
(to keep it as a private threat). The professor said that the logic problems in this 
experiment measure very basic reasoning abilities and it seems like the participant lacks 
them. She recommended that the participant talks to his/her academic advisor about this 
to ask for a class to take. Similar to true and false accusation conditions, the experimenter 
asked the participant to write down what happened, what he/she thought about the logic 
problems, and whatever he/she would like to say.  
Finally, in the neutral feedback condition, the experimenter said that he/she scored 
the logic problems and everything went well. He/she realized, however, that there was 
something wrong with the materials of the next part and he/she called the professor in 
charge. The professor helped the experimenter get everything straightened out and he/she 
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needs to make some copies. In the meantime, the experimenter asked the participant to 
give feedback about the problems and to write down how he/she solved them and 
whatever he/she would like to say. The essays in each threat condition were later coded 
based on the behavioral response list in Experiment 1 (Table 1; adapted from a paradigm 
developed by Russano et al., 2005, and Scherr & Madon, 2012).   
 Emotions, decision making, and evaluations. The experimenter left the 
participant’s cubicle and came back after three minutes to ask him/her to finish up the 
essay. In all conditions, the experimenter said that he/she called the professor again and 
she said she would like to talk to the participant herself. While she was getting ready, 
however, she wanted the experimenter to move on to the next task.  
The experimenter explained that the next part was designed to investigate the 
relation between emotions and decision making. Participants were also going to be asked 
to evaluate their teammate and the experimenter. The experimenter explained that the 
evaluation part was going to consist of a survey and a decision making task (i.e., the 
ultimatum game). The experimenter’s research assistantship contract was supposedly with 
the Department of Economics and they wanted participants to evaluate him/her in a 
survey at the end of each study. The average evaluation score at the end of the semester 
would determine whether the department would renew his/her contract or not. In the 
decision making task, the experimenter was going to interact with one of the participants 
and both of them would receive a certain amount of money based on their decisions in the 
task. The experimenter explained that part of his/her wage was going to come from this 
task itself.  
The experimenter then pulled out an envelope of slips and asked the participant to 
draw one to determine who was going to be the other party in the decision making task. If 
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the participant drew a slip that said “responder” he/she would interact with the 
experimenter in the decision making task. In fact, the envelope only contained 
“responder” slips. After determining that the participant was going to be interacting with 
the experimenter in the decision making task, the experimenter went to the confederate’s 
cubicle to inform him/her about the next part and then came back to open up the emotion 
surveys for the participant. This part was presented as a set of questionnaires which were 
designed to obtain information about the relations between emotions and decision 
making.  
Emotion scale and manipulation check. The first task of this part was an emotion 
scale, which was completed on MediaLab. The instructions indicated that previous 
research has revealed a relation between emotions (positive and negative) and decision 
making, and participants would be asked to rate how they felt before the decision making 
task. As a valence manipulation check, they first described their current mood in terms of 
how negative or positive and how pleasant or unpleasant they felt on a scale of 1 (not at 
all) to 5 (very much). As an honor threat manipulation check they rated the extent to 
which they felt offended and threatened.   
Other emotions they rated were belittled, humiliated, ashamed, embarrassed, 
guilty, angry, hostile, outraged, furious (negative emotions), enthusiastic, excited, alert, 
strong, proud, attentive, calm, peaceful (positive emotions; in randomized order; taken 
from Cross et al., 2014; Kitayama et al., 2009; Uskul et al., 2014). The reliability analyses 
for negative and positive emotions showed that Cronbach’s alphas were sufficiently high 
in Turkey (.91 and .70) and in northern US (.93 and .80) for these scales. Moreover, I 
examined humiliation-related emotions (humiliated, belittled, offended, and threatened) 11 
                                                          
11 I forgot to include criticized in Experiment 2 materials, which was one of the 
humiliation-related emotions in Experiment 1. 
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and anger-related emotions (angry, hostile, outraged, and furious) separately. Cronbach’s 
alphas were sufficiently high for these two scales as well, namely, .83 and .84 for 
humiliation-related emotions and .87 and .93 for anger-related emotions in Turkey and 
northern US, respectively. I calculated the average ratings for these emotions for my 
analyses. 
Face perception task. The emotion scale was followed by a face perception task 
to indirectly investigate the emotions that were evoked by the accusation / feedback. 
Participants viewed five black and white photos of faces representing emotions of anger, 
disgust, fear, sadness, and a neutral expression (taken from the Karolinska Directed 
Emotional Faces Set; Lundqvist, Flykt & Ohman, 1998; see Appendix E). Participants 
rated the extent to which each face depicted emotions of anger, disgust, fear, sadness, 
shame, guilt, and anxiety on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Previous 
research using a similar task showed that individuals who were insulted (i.e., honor 
threat) and who strongly endorsed honor values perceived angry faces as angrier than 
those who were not insulted and who weakly endorsed honor values (IJzerman et al., 
2007). 
I conducted reliability analyses for the overall negative emotion perception by 
including all emotions and all faces participants rated. Cronbach’s alphas were 
sufficiently high in both cultures, namely, .83 in Turkey and .89 in northern US. I also 
conducted reliability analyses for each emotion participants rated by including the faces 
as items of that specific emotion scale. For example, to calculate the reliability of the 
anger scale I included the anger ratings for all five faces. Cronbach’s alphas were below 
.63 in both cultures and the deletion of specific items/faces did not increase Cronbach’s 
alphas to .70 for any scale. Therefore, I only included the average negative emotion 
perception scores in my analyses.  
55 
 
Decision making task - Ultimatum game. After the emotion surveys, the 
participant was introduced to the decision making task, originally termed the ultimatum 
game (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). This is a bargaining game in which there 
is a proposer and a responder. The proposer is given a total amount of money to divide 
between himself/herself and the responder. The responder decides whether to accept or 
reject the proposed amount. If the responder accepts the offer, both players receive the 
amount that was allocated, but if the responder refuses the offer, neither of them receives 
any money. Even though any amount is better than nothing, previous research showed 
that offers less than 20 – 30% of the total amount of money tend to be rejected because 
they are perceived as unfair. Thus, by rejecting an offer, the responder would punish the 
proposer as well as himself/herself (Crockett, Clark, Tabibnia, Lieberman, & Robbins, 
2008; Güth et al., 1982; Yang, Wu, Zhou, Vohs, Mead, & Baumeister, 2013). In that 
sense, rejection of an offer can be considered a competitive but irrational response. 
Acceptance of an offer (especially if it is highly unfair), in contrast, may be considered as 
a cooperative response or compensatory bolstering, and may mostly occur after the 
participant is rightfully accused.  
Adapted from previous studies, there were 18 bargaining games in this study, with 
three high total amounts ($10, $15, $20) and three low total amounts ($2.25, $3, $5). The 
offers were fair (45% of the total amount), unfair (30% of the total amount) and highly 
unfair (20% of the total amount). In a randomized order, participants were presented with 
a total amount along with the offer supposedly made by the experimenter. In fact, all 
offers were predetermined (see Appendix E for the complete list of offers). Participants 
indicated whether they would accept or reject an offer by clicking the appropriate button 
(Crockett et al., 2008) but they were told that the experimenter would not see their 
response until the end of the experiment (so that participants did not think the 
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experimenter was reacting to their decision when they made a new offer). The 
experimenter explained that participants were going to receive payment based on two 
trials that would be randomly selected at the end of the task (Yang et al., 2013); hence, 
the maximum amount of money the participant could gain was $8. After giving the 
instructions and going over two practice trials, the experimenter said that he/she would 
now go to another computer to set up the connection with the participant’s computer and 
to start the task.  
Experimenter and teammate evaluation. As soon as the decision making task 
ended, the participant saw instructions about teammate and experimenter evaluation 
surveys on the screen (Appendix E). Evaluations of the feedback provider, the 
experiment, and the experimenter have been widely used in the literature to measure 
defensive and aggressive behavior (e.g., Stucke & Sporer, 2002). Similarly, in this study, 
participants answered questions about their teammate (the confederate) and the 
experimenter, such as “How helpful was your teammate when you worked together?” and 
“How respectful was the experimenter?” Participants responded to the questions using a 
scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). Cronbach’s alphas for the experimenter evaluation 
scale and the teammate evaluation scale were sufficiently high in both cultures, namely, 
.79 and .82 In Turkey, and .81 and .91 in northern US, respectively. Teammate evaluation 
scale served as a filler to disguise the true purpose of the experiment and was not included 
in the results section.  
Debriefing. At the end of the experiment, the experimenter asked questions that 
were designed to understand whether the participant was able to see the true purpose of 
the experiment (Appendix E). Some example questions were “Was the experiment clear 
in its overall purpose?” and “In your own words, what do you think is the purpose of this 
experiment?” Based on the answers of the participant, the experimenter assigned one of 
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the following suspicion scores for the participant: 1 - not suspicios, 2 – somewhat 
suspicious, and 3 – clearly suspicious. Finally, the experimenter fully debriefed the 
participant and paid him/her $8 for the decision making task. 
Results 
As in Experiment 1, Bonferroni correction was applied to all analyses to overcome 
Type 1 error. I conducted the analyses with and without gender and reported the effects of 
gender in the footnotes only if they were significant. Sample sizes may differ across 
analyses due to missing data in the outcome variables.  
Manipulation Check 
To understand whether my manipulations worked, I conducted univariate 
ANCOVAs for each manipulation check variable, in which I entered culture (Turkey and 
northern US) and threat condition (true accusation, negative performance feedback, false 
accusation, and neutral feedback) as between-subjects factors, and age, upbringing, and 
SES as control variables. I reported the main and interaction effects of culture and threat 
condition only in Table 8. Univariate ANCOVAs that were conducted separately for each 
culture and threat condition as well as specific pairwise comparisons are reported in the 
text.  
Mood. In both cultures, there was a significant main effect of threat condition, 
FTurkey (3, 193) = 9.09, p < .001, η2 = .12, and FUS (3, 170) = 7.11, p < .001, η2 = .11. The 
mood of Turkish participants in the true accusation condition was significantly more 
negative than those in other conditions, ps < .05, ds > .56, except for those in the false 
accusation condition, p = .29, d = .39. Mood ratings did not differ between Turkish 
participants in the false accusation and negative feedback conditions, p = 1.00, d = .15. 
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Participants in the neutral feedback condition reported the most positive mood, ps < .001, 
ds > .53, but the difference between neutral and negative feedback conditions was not 
significant, p = .10, d = .67 (Table 9 for descriptives).  
In northern US, there was no difference between the mood ratings of participants 
in the true accusation, negative performance feedback, and false accusation conditions, ps 
> .18, ds < .43. Northern Americans in the neutral feedback condition reported the most 
positive mood, ps < .01, ds > .87, but the difference between neutral feedback and false 
accusation conditions was not significant, p = .10, d = .57. 
Honor threat. In both cultures, there was a significant main effect of threat 
condition, FTurkey(3, 193) = 15.80, p < .001, η2 = .20, and FUS (3, 170) = 15.87, p < .001, 
η2 = .22. Turkish participants in the true accusation condition experienced greater honor 
threat compared to those in other conditions, ps < .01, ds > .63, except for those in the 
false accusation condition, p = .13, d = .39. Honor threat perception did not differ 
between Turkish participants in the false accusation and negative feedback conditions, p 
= 1.00, d = .22. Turkish participants in the neutral feedback condition perceived the 
lowest honor threat, ps < .01, ds > .89. (Table 9). 
In northern US, participants’ honor threat perception was not different in the true 
accusation, negative performance feedback, and false accusation conditions, ps = 1.00, ds 
< .18. Northern Americans in the neutral feedback condition perceived the lowest honor 
threat compared to those in other conditions, ps < .001, ds > 1.34. 
Main Analyses of Emotional Responses 
As in Experiment 1, I conducted separate univariate ANCOVAs for aggregate 
negative and positive emotions as well as for shame, humiliation-related emotions, and 
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anger-related emotions. I entered culture (Turkey and northern US) and threat condition 
(true accusation, negative performance feedback, false accusation, and neutral feedback) 
as between-subjects factors, and age, upbringing, and SES as control variables. Main 
effects and interaction effects of culture and threat condition are reported in Table 8. 
Univariate ANCOVAs that were conducted separately for each culture and threat 
condition as well as specific pairwise comparisons are reported in the text.  
Cross-cultural comparison of negative and positive emotions. Participants 
completed an emotion scale in which they indicated how they were feeling before the 
decision making task. They also rated the extent to which five faces reflected negative 
emotions such as anger and shame to measure their emotion perception.  
I predicted that Turkish participants in the true accusation condition would 
experience and perceive stronger negative emotions than northern American participants 
(Hypothesis 1a). Contrary to my expectations, the univariate ANCOVA for the true 
accusation condition revealed that participants from the two cultural groups were similar 
in their likelihood to experience negative emotions when they were rightfully accused of 
cheating, F (1, 87) = 1.01, p = .32, d = .23 (Table 10 for descriptives). To examine the 
perception of negative emotions on faces, I conducted another univariate ANCOVA for 
the average ratings of negative emotions displayed in all faces. Contrary to my 
expectations, northern American participants were more likely to perceive negative 
emotions on faces compared to Turkish participants when they were rightfully accused of 
cheating, F (1, 87) = 4.03, p < .05, d = .53 (Table 10).   
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I did not expect any cultural differences for the likelihood to experience positive 
emotions (e.g., excited, strong; Hypothesis 1b). In line with my predictions, culture did 
not have a main effect or an interaction effect for positive emotions, ps > .16 (Table 10).12  
Within-culture comparisons of specific negative emotions. As in Experiment 1, 
I focused on within-culture patterns to overcome the potential issues with cross-cultural 
mean comparisons. I was interested in specific negative emotions, such as shame, guilt, 
humiliation-related emotions (e.g., feeling humiliated, belittled), and anger-related 
emotions (e.g., angry, hostile).  
Shame and humiliation-related emotions (e.g., humiliated, belittled). I also 
expected Turkish participants in the true accusation condition to be most likely to 
experience shame and humiliation-related emotions compared to Turkish participants in 
other conditions. Northern American participants in the true accusation and negative 
performance feedback conditions would experience these emotions at a similar level but 
more strongly compared to northern Americans in other conditions (Hypothesis 1c). 
Univariate ANCOVAs for shame showed a significant main effect of threat condition in 
Turkey, F (3, 193) = 5.67, p < .01, η2 = .08, and in northern US, F (3, 170) = 19.12, p < 
.001, η2 = .25. Partially in line with my predictions, participants in both cultures who 
were rightfully accused and who received negative performance feedback experienced 
similar levels of shame, ps = 1.00, ds < .17, but they experienced more shame than those 
in other conditions, ps < .05, ds > .45 (Table 10). 
Univariate ANCOVAs for humiliation-related emotions also revealed a significant 
main effect of threat condition in Turkey, F (3, 193) = 12.99, p < .001, η2 = .17, and in 
                                                          
12 Men (M = 3.27, SD = .60) were more likely to experience positive emotions than 
women (M = 3.08, SD = .64), F (1, 358) = 4.99, p < .05, d = .31. 
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northern US, F (3, 170) = 16.88, p < .001, η2 = .23. Turkish participants who were 
rightfully accused of cheating experienced the strongest humiliation-related emotions, but 
the only significant difference was between this condition and the neutral feedback 
condition, p < .05, d = 1.42. In line with expectations, northern Americans who were 
rightfully accused were similarly likely to feel humiliated compared to those who 
received negative performance feedback and who were falsely accused, ps > .22, ds < .47, 
but more likely than those who received neutral feedback, p < .001, d = 1.58 (Table 10).  
Shame versus guilt. I predicted that for Turkish participants who were rightfully 
accused, the experience of shame would be more intense than of guilt, whereas for 
northern Americans the pattern would be the opposite (Hypothesis 1d). Different from the 
analyses in this section, I conducted a repeated measures ANCOVA for the true 
accusation condition, in which emotion type (shame vs guilt) was the within-subjects 
variable, culture was the between-subjects variable, and age, upbringing, and SES were 
covariates. Results revealed that participants from both cultural groups were similarly 
likely to state that they would experience shame and guilt, indicated by a non-significant 
culture and emotion type interaction, F (1, 87) = .02, p = .88 (Table 10).13 
Anger-related emotions (e.g., angry, hostile…). I predicted that participants in 
both cultures who were falsely accused of cheating would be most angry compared to 
those in other conditions, because they do not deserve the accusation. I also expected 
Turkish participants in the true accusation condition to be more likely to experience 
anger-related emotions compared to Turkish participants in the remaining conditions. In 
northern US, however, participants in the true accusation and negative performance 
                                                          
13 Women (M = 1.79, SD = 1.11) were more likely to experience guilt than men (M = 
1.45, SD = .93), F (1, 358) = 4.62, p < .05, d = .32. 
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feedback condition would feel anger-related emotions at a similar level and more strongly 
than northern Americans in the neutral feedback condition (Hypothesis 1e). 
The univariate ANCOVAs showed a significant main effect of threat condition in 
Turkey, F (3, 193) = 5.84, p < .01, η2 = .08, and in northern US, F (3, 170) = 7.02, p < 
.001, η2 = .11. Contrary to my expectations, Turkish participants who were falsely 
accused of cheating were similarly angry to those in other conditions, ps > .11, ds < .63. 
Moreover, Turkish participants who were rightfully accused were angrier compared to 
those who received negative performance feedback, but the difference was not 
significant, p = .38, d = .33. Turkish participants who were rightfully accused were 
significantly angrier than those who received neutral feedback, p < .001, d = .96. In 
northern US, participants who were rightfully accused, falsely accused, or who received 
negative performance feedback did not significantly differ in their experience of anger-
related emotions, ps = 1.00, ds < .28, but they felt significantly stronger anger than those 
who received neutral feedback, ps < .05, ds > .78 (Table 10). 
  Summary. As in Experiment 1, participants in the two cultures were similarly 
likely to indicate that they would experience negative emotions when they were rightfully 
accused of cheating. Turkish participants who were rightfully accused were somewhat 
more likely to experience humiliation-related emotions and anger compared to those who 
received negative performance feedback. Unlike in Experiment 1, however, the 
differences were not significant. As expected, there was no difference for northern 
Americans between these two conditions. These results may suggest that being rightfully 
accused of a transgression is perceived as a stronger threat and a greater humiliation for 
Turkish people than is a performance-related self-respect threat, whereas for northern 
Americans these two are similarly threatening and humiliating.  
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Main Analyses of Behavioral Responses 
I predicted that Turkish participants in the true accusation condition would be 
more likely to choose competitive responses (e.g., retaliation in the ultimatum game, 
providing justifications in the essay), less likely to choose cooperative responses (e.g., 
providing apologies in the essay), and more likely to experience defensiveness (i.e., more 
negative evaluation of the threat source) compared to northern Americans (Hypothesis 
2a). In the negative performance feedback condition, Turkish participants would be more 
likely to display avoidant and indirect cooperative responses (e.g., providing excuses in 
the essay, being more cooperative in the ultimatum game, evaluating the experimenter 
more positively) compared to northern Americans (Hypothesis 2b).   
I also hypothesized that in both cultures, participants who were falsely accused 
would be most likely to choose competitive responses, least likely to choose cooperative 
responses, and most likely to be defensive. Moreover, Turkish participants in the true 
accusation condition would be more likely to be defensive, more likely to prefer 
competitive responses, but less likely to prefer cooperative responses compared to those 
in the remaining conditions. In northern US, however, participants in true accusation and 
negative performance feedback conditions would be similar in their defensiveness and 
preference for competitive and cooperative responses (Hypothesis 2c).  
Written statements: Competitive, cooperative, and avoidant responses. After 
being accused of cheating or receiving feedback about their performance, participants 
were asked to write a statement about what happened during the logic problems section. 
Their statements were coded by two research assistants in each culture. Percent 
agreement between coders was .97 in Turkey and .95 in northern US. Disagreements were 
resolved by me.  
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The codes consisted of three categories, namely, competitive responses such as 
rejection of the accusation / negative performance feedback (e.g., “I did not share my 
answer with my partner” or “I do not believe that I have logical thinking issues”) and 
justification of behavior (e.g., “We just discussed our answers assuming that we were 
done”), cooperative responses such as apologizing for cheating or admitting poor 
performance in the problems, and avoidant responses such as finding excuses for 
cheating or poor performance (e.g., “I was tired”). Essays of three Turkish participants 
and four northern American participants were lost; therefore, the sample sizes are lower 
for this outcome variable compared to other variables. I calculated the ratio for each code 
category by dividing the number of codes used in that category by the total number of 
codes used for that participant. For example, if the participant wrote “I admit that I 
cheated” and “I apologize,” the number of codes in the cooperative behaviors category 
would be two. If the participant’s essay had 10 codes in total then the score for the 
cooperative response category was recorded as .20 (two divided by 10; Table 11).  
As in Experiment 1, I conducted separate univariate ANCOVAs for competitive, 
cooperative, and avoidant responses. I entered culture (Turkey and northern US) and 
threat condition (true accusation, negative performance feedback, false accusation, and 
neutral feedback) as between-subjects factors, and age, upbringing, and SES as control 
variables. Main effects and interaction effects of culture and threat condition are reported 
in Table 8. Univariate ANCOVAs that were conducted separately for each culture and 
threat condition as well as specific pairwise comparisons are reported in the text.  
Cross-cultural comparisons. I hypothesized that Turkish participants who were 
rightfully accused of cheating would be more likely to include competitive responses but 
less likely to include cooperative responses in their statements compared to northern 
Americans (Hypothesis 2a). Contrary to my expectations, the univariate ANCOVA for 
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the true accusation condition revealed that participants in the two cultural groups did not 
differ in their likelihood to include competitive or cooperative responses in their essays, F 
(1, 86) = .61, p = .44, d = .22, and F (1, 86) = .02, p = .90, d = .04, respectively (Table 11 
for descriptives).  
I also predicted that in the negative performance feedback condition Turkish 
participants would be more likely to write avoidant responses compared to northern 
Americans (Hypothesis 2b). The univariate ANCOVA for the negative performance 
feedback condition did not reveal a cultural difference in participants’ likelihood of 
writing avoidant responses, F (1, 91) = .04, p = .84, d = .03 (Table 11).  
Within-culture comparisons. I hypothesized that in both cultures, participants 
who were falsely accused would be most likely to include competitive but least likely to 
include cooperative responses in their essays. Moreover, Turkish participants in the true 
accusation condition would be more likely to write competitive but less likely to write 
cooperative responses compared to those in other conditions. In northern US, however, 
participants in true accusation and negative performance feedback conditions would be 
similar in their likelihood of including competitive and cooperative responses (Hypothesis 
2c).  
Univariate ANCOVAs for the competitive response category showed a significant 
main effect of threat condition, FTurkey (3, 190) = 71.32, p < .001, η2 = .53, and FUS (3, 
166) = 44.35, p < .001, η2 = .45. In line with my predictions, participants in both cultures 
who were falsely accused of cheating included significantly more competitive responses 
in their statements compared to those in other conditions, ps < .001, ds > .88. Contrary to 
my predictions, Turkish participants who were rightfully accused were similarly likely to 
write competitive responses compared to Turkish participants in the negative performance 
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feedback condition, p = 1.00, d = .21, but they were more likely to include those 
responses compared to those who received neutral feedback, p < .001, d = 1.68. In line 
with my predictions, northern Americans in the true accusation and negative feedback 
conditions were similarly likely to write cooperative responses in their statements, p = 
1.00, d = .23. Moreover, they were more likely to include these responses compared to 
northern Americans in the neutral feedback condition, ps < .001, ds > 1.41 (Table 11). 
Univariate ANCOVAs for the cooperative response category showed a significant 
main effect of threat condition, FTurkey (3, 190) = 6.06, p < .01, η2 = .09, and FUS (3, 166) 
= 6.83, p < .001, η2 = .11. In line with my predictions, participants in both cultures who 
were falsely accused of cheating included significantly fewer cooperative responses in 
their statements compared to those in the true accusation condition, ps < .01, ds > .67. 
Turkish participants in this condition were also less likely to include these responses 
compared to those in the negative performance feedback condition, p < .05, d = .62. 
Participants in both cultures who were falsely accused were similarly likely to include 
cooperative responses compared to participants in the neutral feedback condition, ps = 
1.00, ds < .36. Contrary to my expectations, Turkish participants in the true accusation 
condition were similarly likely to write cooperative responses compared to those in the 
negative performance feedback condition, p = 1.00, d = .15, but more likely to include 
these responses than those in the neutral feedback condition, p < .05, d = .56. Northern 
Americans in the true accusation condition, however, were more likely to write 
cooperative responses compared to those in the negative feedback and neutral feedback 
conditions, p < .05, ds > .67. Moreover, northern Americans in the negative feedback 
condition were similarly likely to include these responses compared to those in the neutral 
feedback condition, p = .94, d = .47 (Table 11). 
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Decision making task/Ultimatum game: Competitive responses in the form of 
rejecting offers. As another behavioral response to accusation or feedback, participants 
accepted or rejected money offers supposedly made by the experimenter. If they accepted 
the offer both parties would earn the allocated amount of money but if they rejected the 
offer no one would earn any money. This task was included as a measure of retaliation 
against the experimenter (i.e., the accuser/feedback provider). One participant in Turkey 
did not understand this task and was excluded from the analyses.   
Because the dependent variable was a count variable, namely, the number of 
rejections participants made in the Ultimatum Game, I conducted Poisson regressions 
within each culture (e.g., Cameron & Trivedi, 1998). Participants who accepted all 18 
offers were excluded from the analyses (54 participants in Turkey and 39 participants in 
northern US) because their sole motivation may be earning money, and the concerns that 
were more relevant to the purposes of this study, such as retaliating against the 
experimenter, may not be captured in their data. Descriptive statistics excluding these 
participants are presented in Table 12 (for descriptive statistics of all participants see 
Table 13). I conducted two cross-cultural and four within-culture comparisons in total and 
applied the Bonferroni adjustment, such that my new critical value was p < .008. 
Analyses including rejection likelihoods across fairness and offer amounts revealed 
similar results to the overall rejection likelihood; therefore, results are not reported in 
detail. Descriptive statistics across these variables are presented in Table 12.14  
                                                          
14 I also conducted repeated-measures ANCOVAs in each culture, in which offer amount 
and fairness were included as within-subjects variables. In Turkey, there was a significant 
interaction of threat condition, amount, and fairness, F (6, 278) = 3.00, p < .01, η2 = .06, 
but in northern US, interactions of offer amount and fairness with threat condition were 
not significant, ps > .28. Univariate ANCOVAs in Turkey for each dependent variable 
(e.g., rejections for high and fair offers, rejections for high and unfair offers etc.) revealed 
a marginally significant main effect of threat condition only for high and most unfair 
offers, F (3, 139) = 2.32, p = .08, η2 = .05. Pairwise comparison showed that Turkish 
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Cross-cultural comparisons. I predicted that Turkish participants in the true 
accusation condition would be more likely to reject the experimenter’s offers (i.e., 
retaliation) compared to northern Americans (Hypothesis 2a). Results, however, did not 
reveal a significant cultural difference in this condition, Wald = .33, p = .57. I also 
hypothesized and found that, Turkish participants in the negative performance feedback 
condition were less likely to reject the offers - an indicator of indirect cooperation - 
compared to northern Americans (Hypothesis 2b), Wald = 8.01, p < .008 (Table 12). 
Within-culture comparisons. I also hypothesized that in both cultures, 
participants who were falsely accused would be most likely to reject the experimenter’s 
offer compared to those in other conditions. Moreover, Turkish participants in the true 
accusation condition would be more likely to reject the offers compared to those in the 
remaining conditions. In northern US, however, participants in true accusation and 
negative performance feedback conditions would be similar in their rejection likelihood 
(Hypothesis 2c). 
Contrary to my expectations, results did not reveal significant differences between 
Turkish participants’ rejection likelihood in the false accusation condition and in other 
conditions, Walds < 2.16, ps > .14. Northern American participants in the negative 
performance feedback condition were somewhat more likely to reject the experimenter’s 
offers compared to those in the false accusation condition, Wald = 3.63, p = .06. 
Differences between false accusation and the remaining conditions in northern US were 
not significant, ps > .25 (Table 12). Contrary to my predictions, there was no difference 
for the rejection likelihood between Turkish participants in the true accusation and 
                                                          
participants in the true accusation condition who received these offers were significantly 
more likely to reject them compared to those in the false accusation condition, p < .05. No 
other difference was significant, ps > .13. 
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negative performance feedback conditions, Wald = .001, p = .98. In northern US, 
however, participants in the negative performance feedback condition were more likely to 
reject the experimenter’s offers than those in the true accusation condition, Wald = 10.27, 
p < .008 (Table 12). 
Defensiveness reflected in experimenter evaluations. Participants evaluated the 
experimenter in various attributes such as respectfulness and competence. This scale was 
included as a measure of defensiveness (i.e., the more negative evaluation the more 
defensive). I conducted a univariate ANCOVA for this variable, in which culture (Turkey 
and northern US) and threat condition (true accusation, negative performance feedback, 
false accusation, and neutral feedback) were entered as between-subjects factors, and age, 
upbringing, and SES as control variables. Main effects and interaction effects of culture 
and threat condition are reported in Table 8. Univariate ANCOVAs that were conducted 
separately for each culture and threat condition as well as specific pairwise comparisons 
are reported in the text.  
Cross-cultural comparison. I hypothesized that Turkish participants who were 
rightfully accused of cheating would evaluate the experimenter more negatively 
compared to northern Americans in this condition (Hypothesis 2a). Contrary to my 
expectations, the univariate ANCOVA for the true accusation condition did not reveal a 
significant cultural difference in the evaluation of the experimenter, F (1, 87) = .16, p = 
.69, d = .31. I also hypothesized and found that Turkish participants who received 
negative performance feedback would evaluate the experimenter more positively 
compared to northern Americans in this condition (Hypothesis 2b), F (1, 94) = 7.00, p < 
.05, d = .69  (Table 14 for descriptives).  
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Within-culture comparisons. I also hypothesized that in both cultures, 
participants who were falsely accused would evaluate the experimenter most negatively 
compared to participants in other conditions. Moreover, Turkish participants in the true 
accusation condition would evaluate the experimenter more negatively compared to those 
in the remaining conditions. In northern US, however, participants’ evaluation of the 
experimenter in true accusation and negative performance feedback conditions would be 
similar (Hypothesis 2c). Univariate ANCOVAs showed a significant main effect of threat 
condition, FTurkey (3, 193) = 3.90, p < .05, η2 = .06, and FUS (3, 169) = 7.61, p < .001, η2 = 
.12. Contrary to my predictions, Turkish participants in the false accusation condition did 
not significantly differ in their experimenter evaluation from those in other conditions, ps 
> .47, ds < .39. Turkish participants in the true accusation condition evaluated the 
experimenter more negatively than those in negative performance feedback condition, but 
the difference was not significant, p = .19, d = .47. Turkish participants in the true 
accusation condition evaluated the experimenter significantly more negatively than those 
in the neutral feedback condition, p < .01, d = .70. Partially in line with my predictions, 
northern American participants in the false accusation, true accusation, and negative 
performance feedback conditions did not differ in their experimenter evaluation, ps = 
1.00, ds < .16. They evaluated the experimenter significantly more negatively than those 
who received neutral feedback, ps < .01, ds > .95 (Table 14). 
Summary. As in Experiment 1, there were no cross-cultural differences in the 
likelihood to display competitive, cooperative, or avoidant behaviors for participants who 
were rightfully accused of cheating. In the negative performance feedback condition, 
however, Turkish participants were more cooperative (fewer rejections in the ultimatum 
game) and less defensive (more positive evaluation of the experimenter) compared to 
northern American participants. This may suggest that receiving negative performance 
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feedback (a self-respect threat) is perceived as more threatening by northern Americans 
than by Turkish people.  
In both cultures, participants who were falsely accused of cheating were most 
likely to include competitive responses in their written statements (e.g., refusal of the 
accusation/feedback) compared to those in other conditions. Moreover, participants from 
both cultures in the true accusation condition were similarly likely to write competitive 
statements as those in the negative feedback condition. Similarly, in Turkey, the 
likelihood of rejecting offers in the ultimatum game (a competitive response) was similar 
across these two conditions. Interestingly, however, northern Americans who received 
negative performance feedback were more likely to reject offers compared to northern 
Americans who were rightfully or falsely accused of cheating. This may indicate that for 
northern Americans, responding to a self-respect threat requires more competitive 
behaviors than responding to an accusation of a transgression, even if the person does not 
deserve it. Finally, Turkish participants who were rightfully accused of cheating 
displayed somewhat greater defensiveness (more negative ratings of the experimenter) 
compared to those who received negative performance feedback, but the difference was 




CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
Conflicts occur in many contexts such as work. A manager may rightfully accuse an 
employee for stealing his/her ideas in front of everyone or privately criticize the employee 
for making an unintentional mistake or performing poorly due to lack of knowledge or 
capacity. In this work, I investigated cross-cultural and within-culture tendencies to 
respond to these different conflict situations.  
This work is one of the most extensive investigations of conflict types, honor 
concerns, and the emotional and behavioral responses people from honor and dignity 
cultures can display. There has been research on how members of honor and dignity 
cultures feel and respond when they are falsely accused; however, there had been no 
research until now that focused on how they feel and respond when they are the offender or 
when they are rightfully accused. In this work, I focused on rightful accusations as an 
example of a complete honor threat because they attack a person’s self-respect (a 
blameworthy person is usually not proud of himself/herself), moral behavior (the person is 
not honest if he/she has cheated) and social respect (a blameworthy person loses the respect 
of others because of his/her intentional wrongdoing). I compared reactions to true 
accusations with reactions to negative performance feedback, which can be considered an 
example of a self-respect threat. The reason is that the person’s behavior does not involve 
an intentional wrongdoing (i.e., no attack on morality) and the feedback is not given 
publically (i.e., no attack on social respect). I expected Turkish participants to respond 
more negatively to true accusations (a complete honor threat) compared to northern 
Americans and compared to negative performance feedback (a self-respect threat). 
Northern Americans, however, were expected to respond similarly to negative performance 
feedback and true accusations. My findings were partially in line with these predictions, 
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reflecting mostly cross-cultural similarities in mean comparisons of emotional and 
behavioral responses but also interesting differences in within-culture patterns.  
In both experiments I found that participants in the two cultures were similarly 
likely to indicate that they would experience negative emotions when they were rightfully 
accused of cheating. This may suggest that members of both cultural groups perceive 
rightful accusations as similarly unpleasant and threatening. Another possibility, however, 
is that examining the mean differences between cultures can be misleading due to the 
reference group effect, which is participants’ tendency to compare themselves to others in 
their own society rather than to those in other cultures (Heine et al., 2002). This might have 
reduced the existing cultural differences in the constructs I measured. To overcome this 
effect, I examined within-culture patterns of specific emotions across threat types and 
found interesting differences. For Turkish participants, true accusations were more 
humiliating and anger-provoking than negative performance feedback. In northern US, 
however, these two threat types evoked similar levels of humiliation and anger-related 
feelings. These results are in line with previous findings on antecedents of shame and 
humiliation. Studies found that members of honor cultures consider others’ evaluations as 
sources of shame more than members of dignity cultures. Members of dignity cultures, 
however, are more likely to consider failure as a source of shame compared to members of 
honor cultures (e.g., Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000). In the present study, true 
accusations as a complete honor threat involved an evaluation by others and a risk of losing 
others’ respect. Negative performance feedback, however, was an indicator of failure.  
Members of the two cultures were mostly similar in their behavioral responses to 
conflict. Contrary to my expectations, for example, they were similarly willing to 
apologize or display other cooperative responses when they were rightfully accused of a 
transgression. This is in line with cross-cultural work on apologies that did not reveal any 
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cultural differences between East Asian and northern American participants (e.g., Tanaka 
et al., 2000). People from honor cultures may simply be similar to these two cultural 
groups in their willingness to apologize. Another explanation, however, could be that the 
accusation or feedback came from a higher power person in both experiments. People are 
more likely to apologize to higher power than lower power accusers, especially in high 
power distance cultures like Turkey (e.g., Takaku, 2000). If the accusation or feedback 
came from an equal power or lower power person I might have found the expected cross-
cultural differences.  
In addition to these cultural similarities in behaviors, there were within-culture 
differences that were noteworthy. In the decision making task in Experiment 2, Turkish 
participants who were rightfully accused and who received negative performance feedback 
were similarly likely to reject the experimenter’s (i.e., the accuser’s/feedback provider’s) 
offers. In northern US, however, participants who received negative performance feedback 
were more likely to reject the offers compared to those who were rightfully accused of 
cheating. Moreover, Turkish participants who were rightfully accused of cheating were 
more defensive (i.e., more likely to evaluate the experimenter negatively) than those who 
received negative performance feedback. For northern Americans, however, there was no 
difference between these two conditions. These results are in line with the centrality of 
social respect in honor cultures like Turkey and the importance of achievements and 
positive self-esteem in individualistic dignity cultures like northern US. When these central 
cultural values were threatened people became defensive and responded competitively.  
Limitations 
One limitation of Experiment 1 could be the low external validity such that 
participants may not be able to imagine the situations described in the scenarios vividly 
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because they may not be relevant to their lives. I tried to overcome this by including 
scenarios from different settings, namely, work and university. Moreover, by comparing 
participants’ reactions across different threat types within and between cultures, I was still 
able to draw conclusions about how conflict management strategies were related to 
culture and threat type. Experiment 2 was another improvement on the realism and 
relevance of the situation because I put participants in a situation in which they were 
actually accused or given negative feedback. 
Another limitation could be that there are several factors other than culture that 
may influence people’s conflict management strategies, such as social class, power 
relations between actors, and voluntariness of the relationship. For example, the 
voluntariness or the ease of leaving the relationship may influence people’s response 
preferences to conflict, such that people may be more likely to choose cooperative rather 
than competitive responses when the relationship is hard to exit.  
Future Directions 
Another potential reason for the lack of cross-cultural differences in responses to 
conflict is that moderators may play a role in people’s likelihood to feel or to behave in 
certain ways. Therefore, I plan to conduct additional analyses with potential moderators 
such as the endorsement of honor values, measured explicitly (e.g., Rodriguez-Mosquera 
et al., 2008) and implicitly (Imura, Berkley, & Brown, 2014). For example, I may find 
cross-cultural differences in responses to honor-related conflict among participants who 
strongly endorse honor values but not among those who weakly endorse these values. The 
reason is that cross-cultural differences in the meaning and content of honor (e.g., the 
emphasis on reputation versus achievements) may be greater among people who strongly 
endorse honor values than those who weakly endorse them. Moreover, I will also analyze 
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the relation between emotions and behaviors across cultures and threat conditions. For 
example, Turkish participants who feel strong shame after being rightfully accused of 
cheating may be more likely to retaliate against the accuser, whereas there may not be a 
strong relation between shame and retaliation for northern Americans.  
One extension of this research could be examining the culture of each actor (honor 
and dignity) in the conflict situation and how belonging to the same or different cultural 
group may influence people’s conflict management strategies. For example, a member of 
an honor culture may be less likely to retaliate when the threat comes from a dignity 
culture member as opposed to another honor culture member. Another extension could be 
switching the focus from self-reports and laboratory studies to cultural products. Popular 
TV series may be one of these products which reflect the dominant cultural norms and 
also shape the members of that culture. For example, a content analysis of the scripts of 
TV sitcoms in both cultures can show the frequency of different types of conflicts (e.g., 
complete honor threats versus self-respect threats) as well as how the characters in the 
sitcom deal with them (e.g., how many times the word apology is mentioned in an 
episode).  
Conclusion 
These results suggest that dominant values, concerns, and emotions in cultures 
may influence people’s responses to conflict. For people from honor cultures like Turkey, 
being rightfully accused for a transgression is more humiliating and anger-provoking than 
receiving poor performance feedback. Moreover, people in honor cultures become more 
defensive in response to rightful accusations compared to negative performance feedback. 
In honor cultures, rightful accusations not only threaten one’s self-respect and perception 
of his/her own morality, but they also threaten one’s worth in the eyes of others. As 
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mentioned earlier, in honor cultures, one’s self-worth strongly depends on other people’s 
opinions of oneself. Therefore, a threat to all three honor dimensions may be perceived as 
more severe than a threat only to the self-respect dimension in these cultures. This work 
also showed that members of dignity cultures, such as northern US, perceived rightful 
accusations and negative performance feedback similarly humiliating and anger-
provoking, and they became similarly defensive in response to these threats. These results 
are in line with the importance and centrality of reputation and social respect in honor 
cultures like Turkey and the emphasis on achievements and positive self-esteem in 
individualistic dignity cultures like northern US (e.g., Uskul et al., 2012).  
The findings of this work may have implications for many contexts such as politics, 
work relations, and romantic relationships. For example, this work may help us understand 
why politicians from some cultures are not willing to admit their wrong-doing as much as 
are politicians from other cultures. It may help us explain why employees with some 
cultural background deal with negative performance feedback more easily than others. We 
may be able to understand why romantic partners respond aggressively to each other for 
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      Table 1 
   Behavioral Responses to Interpersonal Conflict  
Broad Classification of 
Conflict Management 
Strategies 
Dual Concern Theory  Response Types Response Statements 
    
Competitive Force/Dominate Retaliation I would embarrass him/her in the same way as he/she embarrassed me. 
   I would be harsh next time I see him/her, maybe even yell at him/her for what 
he/she did. 
   I would say that he/she is responsible not me. 
  Disapproval/Refusal I would tell him/her that I did not like what he/she did. 
   I would deny that the event has occurred. 
   I would say I didn’t do it. 
   I would say that the event was in the past and does not matter anymore. 
  Justification I would say that what I did was not that bad. 
   I would say that what I did will be beneficial in the long run. 
   I would say that his/her actions contributed to my behavior.  
  Passive-Aggressive (indirect) I would express my concerns in a general way in the group without specifically 
talking to him/her. 
   I would ignore him/her in a way that he/she understands I am angry. 
    
Avoidant Avoid Avoiding I would try not to communicate with him/her or not to run into him/her. 
   I would try to act normal, as if nothing happened. 
I would try to suppress my true feelings. 
  Finding Excuses I would appeal to unusual circumstances such as fatigue or illness for what I did. 
   I would say that everybody makes mistakes. 
   I would emphasize that I was not intentional. 
    
Cooperative Yield Apology/Admitting guilt I would accept full responsibility of what happened. 
   I would acknowledge that I am guilty. 
  Apology/Expressing regret I would say “I’m sorry.” 
   I would express my regret. 
   I would ask for forgiveness. 
  Apology/Offering compensation I would try to provide compensation. 
    
 Problem Solving/Compromising Middle-way I would try to find a middle-of-the-road solution. 
  Consulting Third Party (indirect) I would tell another person, who was not involved, what happened and ask for 
opinion. 
   I would ask a senior person to intervene. 







Summary of Hypotheses and Results for Emotions (Experiment 1 and 2)  
Hypotheses  Predictions Experiment 1 Results Experiment 2 Results 
 
Cross-Cultural 
    
     
Hypothesis 1a Negative emotions when truly 
accused 
Turkey > US TR = US TR = US 
Hypothesis 1b Positive emotions Turkey = US Supported Supported 
     
Within-Culture     
     
Hypothesis 1c Shame and humiliation-related 
emotions 
Turkey: TA > Other Turkey - Shame: Supported 
Turkey - Humiliation: TA = FA > NEG 
(Partially supported) 
Turkey - Shame: TA = NEG > 
Other 
Turkey - Humiliation: Supported 
     
  US: TA = NEG US - Shame: TA > NEG US - Shame: Supported 
   US - Humiliation: TA > NEG 
(Partially supported, marginal) 
US - Humiliation: Supported 
     
Hypothesis 1d Shame versus guilt when truly 
accused 
Turkey: Shame > Guilt TR = US TR = US 
  US: Guilt > Shame   
     
  
Hypothesis 1e Anger-related emotions Turkey, US: FA > Other Turkey, US: Supported Turkey: FA < TA, FA = NEG 
US: FA = TA = NEG 
     
  Turkey: TA > NEG Turkey: Supported Turkey: TA > NEG 
(Partially supported, marginal) 
  US: TA = NEG US: Supported US: Supported 










Summary of Hypotheses and Results for Behavioral Preferences (Experiment 1)  
Hypotheses  Predictions Results 
    
Cross-Cultural    
    
     Hypothesis 2a Competitive and cooperative responses when truly accused Competitive: Turkey > US Competitive: Turkey = US 
  Cooperative: Turkey < US Cooperative: Turkey = US 
    
     Hypothesis 2b Avoidant and indirect cooperative responses after negative 
performance feedback 
Turkey > US Avoidant: Turkey = US 
Indirect: Turkey = US 
    
Within-Culture    
    
     Hypothesis 2c  Competitive responses  Turkey, US: FA > Other Turkey, US: Supported 
  Turkey: TA > NEG Turkey: TA = NEG 
  US: TA = NEG US: Supported 
    
 Cooperative responses  Turkey, US: FA < Other Turkey, US: Supported 
    
  Turkey: TA < NEG Turkey: TA = NEG 
  US: TA = NEG US: Supported 
Note. Hypotheses and results about retaliation and apology behaviors are not reported because they were similar to the results about average 










Summary of Hypotheses and Results for Behavioral Preferences (Experiment 2)  
Hypotheses  Predictions Written Statements 
Decision Making Task  
(Number of Rejections) 
Experimenter Evaluation 
(Negative Ratings) 
      
Cross-Cultural      
      
     Hypothesis 2a Competitive and cooperative responses 
when truly accused 
Competitive: Turkey > US Competitive: Turkey = US Competitive: Turkey = US  ___ 
  Cooperative: Turkey < US Cooperative: Turkey = US ___ ___ 
      
 Defensiveness/Negative evaluation of 
the experimenter when truly accused 
Turkey > US ___ ___ Turkey = US 
      
     Hypothesis 2b Avoidant and indirect cooperative 
responses after negative performance 
feedback 
Turkey > US Avoidant: Turkey = US  
Indirect: Turkey = US  
 
Supported (Indirect cooperation: 
Fewer rejections in Turkey than 
US) 
___ 
      
 Defensiveness/Negative evaluation of 
the experimenter after negative 
performance feedback  
Turkey < US ___ ___ Supported 
      
Within-Culture      
      
     Hypothesis 2c  Competitive responses  Turkey, US: FA > Other Turkey, US: Supported  Turkey: FA = Others ___ 
    US: FA < NEG, FA = Others  
  Turkey: TA > NEG Turkey: TA = NEG  Turkey: TA = NEG  
  US: TA = NEG US: Supported  US: TA < NEG  
      
 Cooperative responses  Turkey, US: FA < Other Turkey: Supported  ___ ___ 
   US: FA = NEG < TA    
  Turkey: TA < NEG Turkey: TA = NEG    
  US: TA = NEG US: TA > NEG    
      
      Defensiveness/Negative evaluation of 
the experimenter 
Turkey, US: FA > Other ___ ___ Turkey: FA = NEG < TA  
US: FA = TA = NEG 
      
  Turkey: TA > NEG   Turkey: Supported 
  US: TA = NEG   US: Supported 


























 Culture  Threat Condition  Culture x Condition 
Outcome Variables Df Error F η2  Df Error F η2  Df Error F η2 
Manipulation Check               
    Deservingness 1 407 .01 .00  3 407 217.66*** .62  3 407     .18 .00 
    Reputation Threat 1 407 23.53*** .06  3 407 158.91*** .54  3 407   1.96 .01 
    Valence 1 407 .96 .00  3 407 477.95*** .78  3 407 2.49+ .02 
Emotions               
    Negative Emotions  1 407 17.84*** .04  3 407 191.12*** .59  3 407  4.36** .03 
    Positive Emotions 1 405 .01 .00  3 405 115.15*** .46  3 405 .70 .01 
    Shame 1 407 9.18** .02  3 407 167.70*** .55  3 407   1.82 .01 
    Humiliation-related Emotions 1 406 17.41*** .04  3 406 148.41*** .52  3 406 2.85* .02 
    Anger-related Emotions 1 407 5.93* .01  3 407 143.29*** .51  3 407 2.35+ .02 
Behavioral Preferences               
    Competitive Behaviors  1 403 .11 .00  3 403 29.62*** .18  3 403   .92 .01 
    Cooperative Behaviors 1 403 .75 .00  3 403 84.88*** .39  3 403 1.40 .01 
    Avoidant Behaviors 1 403 .00 .00  3 403 10.74*** .07  3 403   3.46* .03 
    Retaliation 1 403 .16 .00  3 403 33.10*** .20  3 403 1.37 .01 
    Apology 1 403 3.11+ .01  3 403 148.35*** .53  3 403 .78 .01 
Approval of Behaviors               
    Competitive Behaviors  1 397 11.78** .03  3 397 15.73*** .11  3 397 .05 .00 
    Cooperative Behaviors 1 397  .01 .00  3 397 18.58*** .12  3 397 2.14+ .02 
    Avoidant Behaviors 1 397   7.10** .02  3 397  4.78** .04  3 397    1.26 .01 
    Retaliation 1 397   6.84** .02  3 397 13.57*** .09  3 397 .54 .00 
    Apology 1 397 1.01 .00  3 397 39.50*** .23  3 397 1.88 .01 
               








Table 4  
Descriptive Statistics for Manipulation Check Items (Deservingness, Reputation Threat, and Valence) in Turkey and Northern US across 
Threat Conditions (Experiment 1)  


























 (n = 50) (n = 52) (n = 46) (n = 54)  (n = 55) (n = 57) (n = 57) (n = 47) 
  Mean Mean Mean Mean   Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Manipulation Check (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD)  (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) 
          
Deservingness        5.92b, c, d     4.63a, c        1.64a, b, d     4.95a, c          5.95b, c, d      4.81a, c       1.89a, b, d     4.99a, c 
 (1.04) (1.44) (1.17) (1.08)  (1.23) (1.38) (1.27) (1.13) 
          
Reputation Threat     5.67b,d        3.99a, c, d     5.04b, d        2.21a, b, c       6.01b, d        5.07a, c, d     5.93b, d        2.84a, b, c 
 (1.24) (1.26) (1.47) (1.13)  (1.01) (1.13) (1.02) (1.26) 
          
Valence      1.64 b, d         2.11 a, c, d      1.43 b, d        5.10 a, b, c    1.59d  1.75d  1.66d        5.02 a, b, c 
 (0.84) (0.77) (0.50) (0.98)  (0.77) (0.58) (0.67) (0.97) 
          
Note. Letters under the condition names are used as subscripts to show significant differences across threat conditions within cultural groups. For example, if the true 











Descriptive Statistics for Negative and Positive Emotions in Turkey and Northern US across Threat Conditions (Experiment 1)  


























 (n = 50) (n = 52) (n = 46) (n = 54)  (n = 55) (n = 57) (n = 57) (n = 47) 
  Mean Mean Mean Mean   Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Emotions (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD)  (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) 
                  
Negative Emotions       4.47b,d       3.42a,c,d     4.20b,d      1.81a,b,c    4.62d    4.22c,d    4.98b,d      1.92a,b,c 
 (1.16) (0.94) (0.94) (0.86)  (0.89) (0.93) (0.75) (0.95) 
          
Positive Emotions      2.15c,d   2.58d     2.97a,d      4.36a,b,c     2.31c,d    2.38c,d      2.91a,b,d      4.31a,b,c 
 (0.74) (1.00) (1.13) (0.86)  (0.81) (0.70) (0.78) (1.00) 
          
Shame      5.99b,c,d      4.38a,c,d      3.01a,b,d      2.01a,b,c       6.13b,c,d      5.21a,c,d      3.37a,b,d      1.97a,b,c 
 (1.17) (1.63) (1.83) (1.30)  (1.10) (1.42) (1.58) (1.08) 
          
Humiliation-Related      4.34b,d      3.27a,c,d     4.62b,d      1.73a,b,c     4.57c,d    4.20c,d       5.49a,b,d      2.01a,b,c 
 (1.44) (1.21) (1.26) (0.88)  (1.09) (1.20) (0.90) (1.05) 
          
Guilt      5.96b,c,d      4.50a,c,d     1.93a,b    1.91a,b       6.24b,c,d      5.51a,c,d    2.54a,b    1.96a,b 
 (1.06) (1.46) (1.41) (1.19)  (1.07) (1.39) (1.51) (1.19) 
          
Anger-Related       3.45b,c,d       2.67a,c,d       4.87a,b,d      1.70a,b,c     3.51c,d    3.43c,d       5.42a,b,d       1.77a,b,c 
 (1.59) (1.20) (1.28) (0.84)  (1.37) (1.10) (1.01) (0.91) 
                  
Note. Letters under the condition names are used as subscripts to show significant differences across threat conditions within cultural groups. For example, if the         









Descriptive Statistics for Behavioral Preferences in Turkey and Northern US across Threat Conditions (Experiment 1)  


























 (n = 49) (n = 52) (n = 46) (n = 51)  (n = 55) (n = 57) (n = 57) (n = 47) 
  Mean Mean Mean Mean   Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Behavioral Preferences (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD)  (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) 
                  
Competitive Responses   2.43c    2.08c,d      3.35a,b,d    2.65b,c    2.37c 2.21c     3.22a,b,d  2.37c 
 (1.09) (0.77) (0.72) (0.91)  (1.16) (0.83) (0.85) (0.79) 
          
Cooperative Responses    4.67c,d    4.72c,d     2.77a,b     3.32a,b     4.76c,d    4.83c,d    3.27a,b    3.26a,b 
 (1.13) (0.99) (0.77) (1.24)  (0.78) (1.04) (0.94) (1.11) 
          
Avoidant Responses     3.46c,d  3.20c    2.61a,b  2.92a   3.27d  3.52d 3.10    2.73a,b 
 (1.31) (0.89) (0.73) (0.99)  (1.08) (0.89) (0.93) (0.78) 
          
Indirect Cooperative Responses  3.04c   3.51c      4.46a,b,d  3.33c   3.14c   3.52c      4.89a,b,d   2.97c 
 (1.56) (1.49) (1.65) (1.39)  (1.34) (1.27) (1.42) (1.33) 
          
Retaliation  2.11c  1.72c      3.43a,b,d  2.02c   2.12c  1.79c      2.92a,b,d  1.79c 
 (1.32) (1.04) (1.38) (0.94)  (1.27) (0.89) (1.16) (0.85) 
          
Apology     5.21c,d    5.00c,d       2.05a,b,d      3.16a,b,c      5.45c,d     5.31c,d    2.69a,b    3.30a,b 
 (1.38) (1.20) (1.00) (1.31)  (1.05) (1.18) (1.30) (1.13) 
                  
Note. Letters under the condition names are used as subscripts to show significant differences across threat conditions within cultural groups. For example, if the true 









Descriptive Statistics for Perceived Approval of Behaviors by Others in Turkey and Northern US across Threat Conditions (Experiment 1)  


























 (n = 48) (n = 50) (n = 46) (n = 48)  (n = 55) (n = 57) (n = 57) (n = 47) 
  Mean Mean Mean Mean  Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Approval of Behaviors (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD)  (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) 
                  
Competitive Responses   2.73c  2.96c    3.75a,b 3.11    2.32c  2.58c      3.26a,b,d  2.66c 
 (1.24) (1.38) (0.79) (1.02)  (1.08) (1.04) (0.86) (0.82) 
          
Cooperative Responses  4.93c  4.76c     3.72a,b  4.24     4.93c,d    5.04c,d    4.25a,b    4.02a,b 
 (1.18) (1.23) (1.23) (1.34)  (0.82) (0.92) (1.06) (1.24) 
          
Avoidant Responses 3.68  3.88 3.54 3.55   3.14b    3.80a,d 3.44  3.12b 
 (1.32) (1.24) (1.02) (1.17)  (0.96) (0.85) (0.87) (0.89) 
          
Indirect Cooperative Responses   3.93c 4.43    5.18a,d  4.23c    3.57c  4.03c      5.03a,b,d  3.74c 
 (1.60) (1.57) (1.35) (1.42)  (1.34) (1.89) (1.14) (1.45) 
          
Retaliation  2.31c  2.60c      3.58a,b,d  2.52c   2.01c  2.22c       2.85a,b,d  2.09c 
 (1.41) (1.55) (1.32) (1.28)  (1.25) (1.23) (1.09) (0.95) 
          
Apology    5.22c,d  4.81c      3.16a,b,d    4.15a,c     5.54c,d    5.40c,d    3.95a,b    4.10a,b 
 (1.51) (1.39) (1.55) (1.46)  (1.05) (1.08) (1.37) (1.30) 
          
Note. Letters under the condition names are used as subscripts to show significant differences across threat conditions within cultural groups. For example, if the true 









Univariate ANCOVA Results for Experiment 2 Outcome Variables 
 Culture  Threat Condition  Culture x Condition 
Outcome Variables Df Error F η2  Df Error F η2  Df Error F η2 
Manipulation Check     
 
    
 
    
    Mood 1 366 .41 .00 
 
3 366 15.87*** .12 
 
3 366 .58 .01 
    Honor Threat 1 366 .71 .00 
 
3 366 30.68*** .20 
 
3 366 1.66 .01 
Emotions     
 
    
 
    
    Negative Emotions (Scale) 1 366 1.22 .00 
 
3 366 30.05*** .20 
 
3 366 1.58 .01 
    Negative Emotions (Faces) 1 365 1.98 .01 
 
3 365 4.04** .03 
 
3 365 .67 .01 
    Positive Emotions 1 366 2.00 .01 
 
3 366 10.65*** .08 
 
3 366 .77 .01 
    Shame 1 366 .50 .00 
 
3 366 24.07*** .17 
 
3 366 2.10 .02 
    Humiliation-related Emotions 1 366 .32 .00 
 
3 366 29.51*** .20 
 
3 366 1.60 .01 
    Anger-related Emotions 1 366 1.12 .00 
 
3 366 12.88*** .10 
 
3 366 .69 .01 
Behavioral Preferences     
 
    
 
    
    Competitive Responses in Essays 1 359 .04 .00 
 
3 359 113.53*** .49 
 
3 359 .81 .01 
    Cooperative Responses in Essays 1 359 .50 .00 
 
3 359 113.53*** .49 
 
3 359 .96 .01 
    Avoidant Responses in Essays 1 359 2.22 .01 
 
3 359 25.15*** .17 
 
3 359 1.15 .01 
    Experimenter Evaluation 1 365 4.51* .01 
 
3 365 10.78*** .08 
 
3 365 1.70 .01 
               













Descriptive Statistics for Manipulation Check Items (Mood and Honor Threat Perception) in Turkey and Northern US across Threat 
Conditions (Experiment 2)  


























 (n = 49) (n = 52) (n = 55) (n = 44)  (n = 43) (n = 47) (n = 47) (n = 40) 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean  Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Manipulation Check (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD)  (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) 
Mood     2.77b,d  3.26a  3.12d   3.72a,c    2.87d         3.12d          3.28    3.73a,b 
 (.85) (.87) (.94) (.86)  (1.04) (.72) (.90) (.67) 
Honor Threat     2.69b,d   2.10a,d  2.30d     1.44a,b,c   2.53d         2.40d  2.34d    1.25a,b,c 
 (1.03) (.82) (.99) (.65)  (1.09) (.97) (1.06) (.44) 
          
Note. Letters under the condition names are used as subscripts to show significant differences across threat conditions within cultural groups. For example, if the true 












Descriptive Statistics for Negative and Positive Emotions in Turkey and Northern US across Threat Conditions (Experiment 2)  


























 (n = 49) (n = 52) (n = 55) (n = 44)  (n = 43) (n = 47) (n = 47) (n = 40) 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean  Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Emotions (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD)  (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) 
Negative Emotions (Scale)    2.13c,d  1.77d  1.60a    1.28a,b     2.34c,d  2.14c,d     1.64a,b,d    1.21a,b,c 
 (.85) (.74) (.72) (.43)  (1.00) (.89) (.60) (.33) 
Negative Emotions (Faces) 3.23 3.11 3.03 3.03  3.60d         3.27 3.27 3.15a 
 (.63) (.66) (.50) (.55)  (.75) (.77) (.73) (.69) 
          
Positive Emotions    2.94c,d 3.09  3.25a 3.30a  2.90d 3.00d 3.27   3.48a,b 
 (.63) (.58) (.59) (.54)  (.74) (.66) (.62) (.46) 
Shame     2.27c,d   2.13d   1.65a   1.45a,b     2.51c,d    2.30c,d  1.32a,b  1.15a,b 
  (1.29) (1.09) (1.04) (.85)  (1.32) (1.21) (.73) (.43) 
          
Humiliation-Related  2.37d  1.99d   2.01d    1.32a,b,c   2.48d   2.44d 2.05d     1.28a,b,c 
 (.91) (.82) (.93) (.51)  (1.01) (1.01) (.82) (.36) 
Guilt      2.33b,c,d 1.42a 1.29a 1.36a       2.77b,c,d    1.74a,d 1.30a   1.10a,b 
 (1.26) (.78) (.71) (.81)  (1.27) (1.01) (.83) (.30) 
Anger-Related 1.93d 1.63 1.62 1.22a   2.03d 1.95d 1.75d     1.19a,b,c 
 (.99) (.85) (.83) (.35)  (1.10) (.93) (.94) (.36) 
          
Note. Letters under the condition names are used as subscripts to show significant differences across threat conditions within cultural groups. For example, if the true 









Descriptive Statistics for the Ratio of Essay Responses in Turkey and Northern US across Threat Conditions (Experiment 2) 


























 (n = 49) (n = 50) (n = 54) (n = 44)  (n = 42) (n = 46) (n = 46) (n = 39) 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean  Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Essay Responses (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD)  (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) 
 
Competitive Responses     .44c,d     .36c,d      .90a,b,d      0a,b,c     .52c,d    .43c,d      .83a,b,d      0a,b,c 
(Rejection, Justification, Other) (.37) (.40) (.27) (0)  (.35) (.43) (.35) (0) 
Rejection     .13b,c       .36a,c,d      .88a,b,d    0b,c     .11b,c      .43a,c,d      .81a,b,d    0b,c 
 (.26) (.40) (.30) (0)  (.27) (.43) (.36) (0) 
Justification       .31b,c,d   0a  .02a  0a       .42b,c,d  0a   .03a  0a 
 (.32) (0) (.14) (0)  (.35) (0) (.10) (0) 
Cooperative Responses     .15c,d   .11c    0a,b   .03a       .16b,c,d   .05a  .02a  0a 
(Apology/Admission) (.28) (.25) (0) (.12)  (.25) (.15) (.15) (0) 
Avoidant Responses       .40b,c,d    .19a,c     .02a,b  .13a     .28c,d  .18c     .03a,b   .04a 
(Excuses) (.36) (.33) (.08) (.29)  (.32) (.33) (.10) (.18) 
          
Note. The ratio for each code category was calculated by dividing the number of codes used in that category by the total number of codes used for that participant. The 
columns do not sum to 1.00 because the competitive responses category is aggregated across rejection, justification, and other competitive responses, and the “overall 









Descriptive Statistics for the Number of Rejections in the Ultimatum Game in Turkey and Northern US across Threat Conditions, Excluding 
Participants Who Accepted All 18 Offers (Experiment 2)  


















 (n = 37) (n = 37) (n = 40) (n = 33)  (n = 38) (n = 35) (n = 36) (n = 28) 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean  Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Number of Rejections (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD)  (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) 
 
Total  6.97 6.46 6.25 6.64  7.45 9.54 7.92 8.29 
 (4.79) (3.73) (3.58) (3.01)  (3.78) (4.45) (4.59) (3.79) 
High Offers 2.46 1.78 1.66 1.70  3.26 3.97 3.36 3.29 
 (2.30) (1.99) (1.97) (1.59)  (2.19) (2.56) (2.39) (1.84) 
    Most Unfair Offers 1.51 1.11 .93 1.21  2.00 1.91 1.83 1.64 
 (1.19) (1.02) (1.02) (1.67)  (1.14) (1.17) (1.21) (1.06) 
    Unfair Offers  .70 .54 .65 .39  1.11 1.57 1.14 1.11 
 (.91) (.93) (.92) (.61)  (1.06) (1.17) (1.10) (.96) 
          
    Fair Offers .24 .13 .10 .09  .16 .49 .39 .54 
 (.68) (.42) (.30) (.29)  (.44) (.89) (.87) (.92) 
          
Low Offers 4.51 4.68 4.58 4.94  4.18 5.57 4.56 5.00 
 (3.01) (2.30) (2.25) (1.97)  (2.13) (2.49) (2.55) (2.58) 
          
    Most Unfair Offers 2.08 2.41 2.33 2.39  2.08 2.46 2.11 2.21 
 (1.01) (.76) (.89) (.86)  (.97) (.82) (.85) (1.13) 
          
    Unfair Offers 1.54 1.65 1.80 1.82  1.63 2.14 1.78 1.82 
 (1.24) (1.16) (1.16) (1.07)  (1.08) (1.09) (1.12) (1.16) 
          
    Fair Offers .89 .62 .45 .73  .47 .97 .67 .96 
 (1.22) (.89) (.75) (.91)  (.76) (1.15) (1.07) (1.23) 





Table 13  
Descriptive Statistics for the Number of Rejections in the Ultimatum Game in Turkey and Northern US across Threat Conditions, All 
Participants (Experiment 2)  


















 (n = 49) (n = 52) (n = 57) (n = 43)  (n = 43) (n = 47) (n = 46) (n = 40) 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean  Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Number of Rejections (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD)  (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) 
 
Total  5.27 4.60 4.39 5.09  6.58 7.11 6.20 5.80 
 (5.14) (4.31) (4.15) (3.87)  (4.29) (5.68) (5.23) (4.97) 
High Offers 1.86 1.27 1.18 1.30  2.88 2.96 2.63 2.30 
 (2.26) (1.86) (1.81) (1.57)  (2.31) (2.81) (2.53) (2.16) 
    Most Unfair Offers 1.14 .79 .65 .93  1.77 1.43 1.43 1.15 
 (1.22) (1.00) (.95) (1.14)  (1.25) (1.31) (1.31) (1.17) 
    Unfair Offers  .53 .38 .46 .30  .98 1.17 .89 .78 
 (.84) (.82) (.83) (.56)  (1.06) (1.22) (1.08) (.95) 
          
    Fair Offers .18 .10 .07 .07  .14 .36 .30 .38 
 (.60) (.36) (.26) (.26)  (.41) (.79) (.79) (.81) 
          
Low Offers 3.41 3.33 3.21 3.79  3.70 4.15 3.57 3.50 
 (3.27) (2.88) (2.83) (2.72)  (2.42) (3.26) (2.94) (3.16) 
          
    Most Unfair Offers 1.57 1.71 1.63 1.84  1.84 1.83 1.65 1.55 
 (1.26) (1.27) (1.30) (1.27)  (1.13) (1.29) (1.16) (1.40) 
          
    Unfair Offers 1.16 1.17 1.26 1.40  1.44 1.60 1.39 1.28 
 (1.26) (1.23) (1.28) (1.22)  (1.14) (1.34) (1.24) (1.28) 
          
    Fair Offers .67 .44 .32 .56  .42 .72 .52 .68 
 (1.13) (.80) (.66) (.85)  (.73) (1.08) (.98) (1.12) 











Descriptive Statistics for the Experimenter Evaluations in Turkey and Northern US across Threat Conditions (Experiment 2)  


























 (n = 49) (n = 52) (n = 55) (n = 44)  (n = 43) (n = 47) (n = 46) (n = 40) 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean  Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Evaluation (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD)  (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) 
 
Experimenter Evaluation   5.96d 6.34 6.21  6.53a    5.64d  5.80d   5.70d     6.51a,b,c 
 (.97) (.59) (1.01) (.62)  (1.11) (.93) (1.03) (.50) 
          
Note. Letters under the condition names are used as subscripts to show significant differences across threat conditions within cultural groups. For example, if the true 
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APPENDIX B. PILOT STUDY AND EXPERIMENT 1 SCENARIOS 
Work Context, Plagiarism (used in the main online study) 
True accusation. You are an entry level employee in the creative department of an 
advertising agency and Amanda is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she 
will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine your 
salary for next year and whether you will get a bonus or not. You work closely with 
Amanda in a project group, which is developing an advertisement strategy for a new 
product for one of the agency’s clients. One day, the project group holds a meeting in 
which everyone presents their ideas to the client. You had been struggling with generating 
good strategies and decided to take a risk. You looked at the company archives and found 
Amanda’s projects from 5 years ago. You took the ideas you liked and presented them as 
if they were yours. Once you finish your presentation, Amanda comes to your office and 
says: “These are good ideas; however, I wish they were yours. How could you think that I 
wouldn’t remember my own ideas from my own projects?” You realize you are being 
rightfully accused of dishonesty. 
Negative performance feedback. You are an entry level employee in the creative 
department of an advertising agency and Amanda is the head of the department. At the 
end of the year, she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will 
determine your salary for next year and whether you will get a bonus or not. You work 
closely with Amanda in a project group, which is developing an advertisement strategy 
for a new product for one of the agency’s clients. One day, the project group holds a 
meeting in which everyone presents their ideas to the client. You have been working hard 
on this on your own in the last month and you are confident that you did a good job. Once 
the meeting is over, Amanda calls you to her office and says: “These are good ideas; 
however, they are not comprehensive enough. You did not cover any outdoor 
advertisement strategies, which were clearly mentioned in the briefing document I gave 
you. Our clients were not happy about it and they even implied that they may not work 
with us next year.”  You realize you made a big mistake.  
False accusation. You are an entry level employee in the creative department of 
an advertising agency and Amanda is the head of the department. At the end of the year, 
she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine your 
salary for next year and whether you will get a bonus or not. You work closely with 
Amanda in a project group, which is developing an advertisement strategy for a new 
product for one of the agency’s clients. One day, the project group holds a meeting in 
which everyone presents their ideas to the client. You have been working hard on this on 
your own in the last month and you are confident that you did a good job. Once you finish 
your presentation, Amanda calls you to her office and says: “These are good ideas; 
however, I wish they were yours. I was the one who mentioned these ideas in our last 
group meeting.” You realize you are being falsely accused of dishonesty. 
Neutral feedback. You are an entry level employee in the creative department of 
an advertising agency and Amanda is the head of the department. At the end of the year, 
she will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine your 
salary for next year and whether you will get a bonus or not. You work closely with 
Amanda in a project group, which is developing an advertisement strategy for a new 
product for one of the agency’s clients.  One day, the project group holds a meeting in 
which everyone presents their ideas to the client. You have been working hard on this on 
your own in the last month and you feel that you did a satisfactory job. Once the meeting 
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is over, Amanda calls you to her office and says: “This was a good meeting. Let’s talk 
about the timeline that the client requested and plan for the next month’s project.”  You 
feel relieved that you were prepared.   
Work Context, Missing a Meeting / Lying (used in the main online study) 
True accusation. You went to the bars last night, drank a lot and overslept this 
morning, even though you knew there was an important meeting at the marketing 
research company where you work as an entry-level employee. You missed a connection 
bus, hence you miss the meeting as well. The meeting was an end of the year meeting 
with an important client, which would determine whether the client will work with your 
company next year or not. You go to your senior manager’s room as soon as you arrive 
and explain why you were late. You say that there was an accident that caused an unusual 
amount of traffic. The manager, who will determine next year’s promotions, does not 
believe you and says, "Yeah, right. We have heard a lot of such excuses. I use the same 
highway and there was no accident whatsoever at that time this morning. This meeting 
was very important and the client wanted to see your projects. I wouldn’t be surprised if 
they decided not to work with us next year.” You realize that you have been caught lying.  
Negative feedback.  You missed a connection bus due to an accident that caused 
an unusual amount of traffic. This caused you to miss a meeting at the marketing research 
company where you work as an entry-level employee. The meeting was an end of the 
year meeting with an important client, which would determine whether the client will 
work with your company next year or not. You go to your senior manager’s room as soon 
as you arrive and explain why you were late. The manager, who will determine next 
year’s promotions, believes you but says, "I understand but this is very unfortunate. The 
meeting was very important and the client wanted to see your projects. I wouldn’t be 
surprised if they decided not to work with us next year." You realize that you may have 
caused a big problem. 
False accusation. You missed a connection bus due to an accident that caused an 
unusual amount of traffic. This caused you to miss a meeting at the marketing research 
company where you work as an entry-level employee. The meeting was an end of the 
year meeting with an important client, which would determine whether the client will 
work with your company next year or not. You go to your senior manager’s room as soon 
as you arrive and explain why you were late. The manager, who will determine next 
year’s promotions, does not believe you and says, "Yeah, right. We have heard a lot of 
such excuses. This meeting was very important and the client wanted to see your projects. 
I wouldn’t be surprised if they decided not to work with us next year.” You realize that 
you are being falsely accused of lying.  
Neutral feedback. You missed a connection bus due to an accident that caused an 
unusual amount of traffic. You thought this would cause you to miss a meeting at the 
marketing research company where you work as an entry-level employee. The meeting 
was an end of the year meeting with an important client, which would determine whether 
the client will work with your agency next year or not. When you arrive at work, 
however, you find that the meeting has been delayed because the client is running late. 
You go to your senior manager’s room as soon as the meeting ends. The manager, who 
will determine next year’s promotions, says, “This was a good meeting. Let’s talk about 
the timeline that the client requested.”  You are relieved that you did not miss the 




Work Context, Car Accident  
True accusation. You are an entry level employee in the public relations 
department of a bank and Sarah is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she 
will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine who is 
promoted into a new position that is being created. One day Sarah lends her new car to 
you so that you can go to a meeting. You usually drive carefully but today you are a little 
annoyed by the fact that Sarah is sending you to this meeting instead of going herself. 
While thinking about your irritation with Sarah, your mind wanders, you end up not 
seeing the car coming from the side street, and you collide with it.   Both cars are totaled 
but you and the other driver only have minor injuries. After dealing with the police and 
with the other details you call Sarah to let her know. The police had already contacted 
her. She says: “I can’t believe you were daydreaming as usual and ruined my car. What 
was your problem?” You realize that you are being rightfully accused of causing the 
accident.  
Negative feedback. You are an entry level employee in the public relations 
department of a bank and Sarah is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she 
will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine who is 
promoted into a new position that is being created. One day Sarah lends her new car to 
you so that you can go to a meeting. You usually drive carefully but that day you are 
nervous about the meeting and a little distracted. You end up not seeing the car coming 
from the side street and collide with it. Both cars are totaled but you and the other driver 
only have minor injuries. After dealing with the police and with the other details you call 
Sarah to let her know. The police had already contacted her.  She says: “I realized this 
morning that you were really nervous about the meeting. I wish you were more careful. 
My insurance has a $1000 deductible I will have to pay.” You realize you made a big 
mistake and caused a lot of damage.  
False accusation. You are an entry level employee in the public relations 
department of a bank and Sarah is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she 
will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine who is 
promoted into a new position that is being created. One day Sarah lends her new car to 
you so that you can go to a meeting. You drive carefully but another car does not stop at 
the red light and collides with you. Both cars are totaled but you and the other driver only 
have minor injuries. After dealing with the police and with the other details you call Sarah 
to let her know. The police had already contacted her.  You tell her that you were careful 
and it was the other driver’s fault. She does not believe you and says: “It is always the 
other person’s fault, isn’t it? I can’t believe this. I’m sure you were daydreaming as usual 
and did not pay enough attention.” You realize you are being falsely accused of lying. 
Neutral feedback. You are an entry level employee in the public relations 
department of a bank and Sarah is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she 
will evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine who is 
promoted into a new position that is being created. One day Sarah lends her new car to 
you so that you can go to a meeting. You usually drive carefully but that day you are 
nervous about the meeting and a little distracted. You nearly miss a car coming from the 
side street and almost collided with it but you were able to break at the last minute. After 
the meeting you call Sarah to tell her how it went. She says: “Good, we better get started 
on their project then. Let’s meet when you get back and talk about the time line.” You 




Work Context, Gossip 
True accusation. You are an entry level employee in the marketing department of 
a company and Jenna is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she will 
evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine who will get 
some new responsibilities that include a higher salary. On a Tuesday, you meet with a 
coworker in a restaurant near the office, where employees usually have their lunch. You 
start talking about Jenna, who has recently told you a secret about herself which could 
potentially damage her career. You decide to tell your coworker Jenna’s secret in detail 
and you two discuss it extensively for a while. When you are leaving, you discover that 
Jenna is seated within earshot and it seems like she has heard what you were talking 
about. You run into her in the office and she says: “I can’t believe you are telling other 
employees about my secret. I overheard you two talking about it. I trusted you.” You 
realize you are rightfully accused of disloyalty. 
Negative feedback. You are an entry level employee in the marketing department 
of a company and Jenna is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she will 
evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine who will get 
some new responsibilities that include a higher salary. On a Tuesday, you meet with a 
coworker in a restaurant near the office, where the employees usually have their lunch. 
You start talking about Jenna, who has recently told you a secret about herself which 
would potentially damage her career. You think about telling her secret to your coworker 
but you decide not to. When you are leaving, you discover that Jenna is seated there as 
well and she sees you. In the office, you run into her in the hallway and she says: “I 
overheard you two talking about me but I know you didn’t tell her anything about my 
secret. Regardless, I don’t like the fact that you talk with another employee about me, it is 
not professional.” You realize you made a mistake by talking about her with another 
employee and you may have violated her trust.  
False accusation. You are an entry level employee in the marketing department of 
a company and Jenna is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she will 
evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine who will get 
some new responsibilities that include a higher salary. On a Tuesday, you meet with a 
coworker in a restaurant near the office, where employees usually have their lunch. You 
start talking about Jenna, who has recently told you a secret about herself which could 
potentially damage her career. You think about telling her secret to your coworker but 
you decide not to. When you are leaving, you discover that Jenna is seated there as well 
and she sees you. You run into her in the office and she says: “I can’t believe you are 
telling other employees about my secret. I overheard you two talking about me. I trusted 
you.” You realize you are falsely accused of disloyalty. 
Neutral feedback. You are an entry level employee in the marketing department of 
a company and Jenna is the head of the department. At the end of the year, she will 
evaluate your performance and that of other employees; she will determine who will get 
some new responsibilities that include a higher salary. On a Tuesday, you meet with a 
coworker in a restaurant near the office, where the employees usually have their lunch. 
You start talking about Jenna, who has recently told you a secret about herself which 
would potentially damage her career. You think about telling her secret to your coworker 
but you decide not to. When you are leaving, you discover that Jenna is seated there as 
well and she sees you. In the office, you run into her in the hallway and she says: “I just 
sent you an e-mail about our new project. Can you look at it when you have a chance?” 
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You realize you feel relieved that she did not hear you talking about her with your 
coworker. 
University Context, Cheating on a Test (used in the main online study) 
True accusation. You are taking an economics class. Students in this class are 
required to work in study groups, in which every member has to study a certain part for 
the exam and present to the others what they have learned. Teresa is the leader of your 
study group and you are the secretary. Teresa’s role is to distribute topics as well as to 
compile and share each person’s slides with the group. Hence she has great control over 
the grade the group gets on the exam. Your role is to take notes during the presentations 
and send them to Teresa. You did not have much time to study the slides for the exam, so 
during the exam you look over Teresa’s exam paper and copy a few of the formulas. Next 
week in class you find out that Teresa, the study group leader, told the professor that you 
copied her answers during the exam. You realize that you are being rightfully accused of 
cheating.  
Negative feedback. You are taking an economics class. Students in this class are 
required to work in study groups, in which every member has to study a certain part for 
the exam and present to the others what they have learned. Teresa is the leader of your 
study group and you are the secretary. Teresa’s role is to distribute topics as well as to 
compile and share each person’s slides with the group. Hence she has great control over 
the grade the group gets on the exam. Your role is to take notes during the presentations 
and send them to Teresa. You did not have much time to study the slides for the exam nor 
did you pay much attention during the presentations. Next week in class, Teresa 
approaches you and says: “I realized that your notes are really bad. We’ll all fail the exam 
with these notes. Didn’t you know how important the notes are because not everything is 
written on the slides?” You realize that you made a big mistake.  
False accusation. You are taking an economics class. Students in this class are 
required to work in study groups, in which every member has to study a certain part for 
the exam and present to the others what they have learned. Teresa is the leader of your 
study group and you are the secretary. Teresa’s role is to distribute topics as well as to 
compile and share each person’s slides with the group. Hence she has great control over 
the grade the group gets on the exam. Your role is to take notes during the presentations 
and send them to Teresa. You did not have much time to study the slides for the exam. 
During the exam, it crosses your mind that you can look over Teresa’s exam paper to 
copy her answers but you decide not to. Next week in class you find out that Teresa, the 
study group leader, told the professor that you copied her answers during the exam. You 
realize that you are being falsely accused of cheating.  
Neutral feedback. You are taking an economics class. Students in this class are 
required to work in study groups, in which every member has to study a certain part for 
the exam and present to the others what they have learned. Teresa is the leader of your 
study group and you are the secretary. Teresa’s role is to distribute topics as well as to 
compile and share each person’s slides with the group. Hence she has great control over 
the grade the group gets on the exam. Your role is to take notes during the presentations 
and send them to Teresa. At the end of the exam, Teresa approaches you and says: “I 
thought the professor would surprise us with some unexpected questions but I didn’t see 





University Context, Stealing (used in the main online study) 
True accusation.  You work as the secretary of one of the student clubs at your 
university, which is usually the role given to the junior members. As part of your 
secretary duties, you handle and oversee the club's financial transactions.  Towards the 
end of the month you realize you need money and you decide to take some money from 
the cashbox of the club. You also decide not to put it back when you have cash again 
because there are no club activities left. After one of your regular meetings, the president 
of the student club approaches you privately and says that you stole funds from the club. 
You realize you are being rightfully accused of dishonesty. 
Negative feedback. You work as the secretary of one of the student clubs at your 
university, which is usually the role given to the junior members. As part of your 
secretary duties, you handle and oversee the club's financial transactions. You have 
usually been careful about your job but that month you were busy with exams, so you did 
a lousy job. You reported the budget needed for next year as much lower than it was 
supposed to be. After one of your regular meetings, the president of the student club 
approaches you privately and says that the university has decided to give a really small 
amount of money to the club because of your wrong budget report. You realize you made 
a big mistake and caused the club to lose money for next year.  
False accusation. You work as the secretary of one of the student clubs at your 
university, which is usually the role given to the junior members. As part of your 
secretary duties, you handle and oversee the club's financial transactions. You have been 
very careful about your job and you are doing everything by the book. After one of your 
regular meetings, the president of the student club approaches you privately and says that 
you have been stealing funds from the club, which cannot be true. You realize you are 
being falsely accused of dishonesty. 
Neutral feedback. You work as the secretary of one of the student clubs at your 
university, which is usually the role given to the junior members. As part of your 
secretary duties, you handle and oversee the club's financial transactions. Recently, you 
reported the club budget to the university to request money for next year’s activities. 
After one of your regular meetings, the president of the student club approaches you 
privately and says that the university officials told him that they received the request.  
You realize that the hardest part of the job is over. 
University Context, Plagiarism 
True accusation. You and Katie are taking the same class and are also in the same 
project group for that class. Every group completes a project and has a leader who is 
responsible for collecting the parts from the members and revising them if necessary. 
Hence, the leader has great control over the grade the group gets for the project. Katie is 
the leader of your group, whereas you are responsible for the background information part 
of the project. You need to read articles about the topic and summarize their findings in 
your own words. In the end, however, you decide to copy and paste parts from existing 
scientific papers without rephrasing anything and without any other group member 
knowing. After you send the final version of the paper to the group, Katie responds and 
says: “I looked at your section and it seems to me that you just copied and pasted the 
information from a few articles without even rephrasing them. This is plagiarism.” You 
realize you are being rightfully accused of dishonesty.  
Negative feedback. You and Katie are taking the same class and are also in the 
same project group for that class. Every group completes a project and has a leader who is 
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responsible for collecting the parts from the members and revising them if necessary. 
Hence the leader has great control over the grade the group gets for that project. Katie is 
the leader of your group, whereas you are responsible for the background information part 
of the project. You have been working hard to read many articles about the topic and to 
summarize their findings in your own words. A week later, Katie sends you an e-mail and 
says: “I don’t know if you saw it but we got a really low score for this project and I think 
you are responsible. I went back to the project and realized that you have missed classic 
articles about the topic that I told you to include.” You realize you made a big mistake.  
False accusation. You and Katie are taking the same class and are also in the same 
project group for that class. Every group completes a project and has a leader who is 
responsible for collecting the parts from the members and revising them if necessary. 
Hence, the leader has great control over the grade the group gets for the project. Katie is 
the leader of your group, whereas you are responsible for the background information part 
of the project. You have been working hard to read many articles about the topic and to 
summarize their findings in your own words. After you send the final version of the paper 
to the group, Katie responds and says: “I looked at your section and it seems to me that 
you just copied and pasted the information from a few articles without even rephrasing 
them. This is plagiarism.” You realize you are being falsely accused of dishonesty.  
Neutral feedback. You and Katie are taking the same class and are also in the 
same project group for that class. Every group completes a project and has a leader who is 
responsible for collecting the parts from the members and revising them if necessary. 
Hence the leader has great control over the grade the group gets for that project. Katie is 
the leader of your group, whereas you are responsible for the background information part 
of the project. You have been working hard to read many articles about the topic and to 
summarize their findings in your own words. You complete your part and send it to Katie. 
She writes back and says: “Thanks. I will add this to the final version.”  You are relieved 
that your part of the task is done.
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APPENDIX C. PILOT STUDY TABLES 
Descriptive Statistics for University Scenarios (Pilot Study) 
  TURKEY US 
  Cheating on a Test* Cheating on a Test* 
  True accusation False accusation  Negative Feedback  Neutral Feedback  True accusation False accusation  Negative Feedback  Neutral Feedback  
  Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n 
Valence 1.45 0.45 11 1.26 0.43 9 2.46 1.34 8 5.58 0.87 12 1.59 0.55 9 1.35 0.60 9 2.00 0.62 9 3.25 1.09 8 
Structure 5.52 1.11 11 5.37 1.06 9 5.50 1.66 8 5.14 0.89 12 6.11 0.94 9 5.56 1.49 9 5.52 1.03 9 5.29 1.35 8 
Feedback Fairness 4.32 1.69 11 1.38 0.46 8 4.44 0.96 8 4.58 0.83 12 5.75 0.89 9 1.82 0.84 9 4.75 0.83 9 3.78 0.85 8 
Honor Threat 4.27 1.99 11 3.25 1.50 8 3.58 2.02 8 2.99 1.83 12 5.48 1.24 9 4.52 1.12 9 4.19 1.70 9 2.99 1.24 8 
Negative Emotions 4.45 1.10 11 4.33 1.80 8 4.24 1.56 8 1.63 1.20 12 5.57 0.94 9 4.74 1.01 9 4.76 1.17 9 2.77 1.20 8 
Positive Emotions 2.48 1.06 11 2.88 1.45 8 3.17 1.02 8 3.72 1.67 12 4.30 0.87 9 3.78 1.21 9 3.96 1.21 9 3.21 1.18 8 
  Stealing Money* Stealing Money* 
  True accusation False accusation  Negative Feedback  Neutral Feedback  True accusation False accusation  Negative Feedback  Neutral Feedback  
  Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n 
Valence 1.13 0.23 10 1.55 0.87 11 1.61 0.57 12 4.83 1.55 14 1.10 0.25 7 1.40 0.47 10 1.78 0.98 10 5.95 1.11 7 
Structure 5.83 0.91 10 5.39 1.39 11 5.36 1.23 12 5.52 1.51 14 6.33 0.75 7 5.67 1.74 10 6.17 0.63 10 6.24 0.92 7 
Feedback Fairness 6.18 0.76 10 2.36 1.74 11 4.35 1.09 12 4.87 1.61 13 6.93 0.12 7 1.85 1.20 10 5.65 0.65 10 6.14 0.96 7 
Honor Threat 6.24 0.60 9 4.40 2.29 11 3.07 1.37 12 3.18 1.90 13 5.86 1.40 7 4.62 2.05 10 5.15 1.95 10 2.57 1.55 7 
Negative Emotions 5.57 1.13 9 4.70 1.42 11 4.24 0.89 12 2.13 1.91 13 5.02 1.02 7 4.35 1.62 10 4.72 1.11 10 1.19 0.50 7 
Positive Emotions 1.96 0.65 9 3.64 1.84 11 2.00 0.84 12 4.28 1.70 13 4.19 1.57 7 4.30 1.25 10 4.05 1.47 10 4.14 0.86 7 
  Plagiarism in Class Project Plagiarism in Class Project 
  True accusation False accusation  Negative Feedback  Neutral Feedback  True accusation False accusation  Negative Feedback  Neutral Feedback  
  Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n 
Valence 2.41 1.36 9 2.92 1.49 13 1.67 0.40 8 4.53 1.23 12 2.25 0.99 8 2.13 0.64 8 1.67 0.42 11 4.78 1.48 12 
Structure 5.85 0.94 9 5.69 1.21 13 5.63 0.86 8 5.36 1.34 12 6.00 0.69 8 6.04 0.72 8 6.24 0.91 11 5.69 0.96 12 
Feedback Fairness 5.94 1.07 9 2.65 1.40 13 4.09 1.68 8 4.35 1.39 12 5.72 0.95 8 1.75 0.86 8 3.48 1.20 11 5.88 0.88 12 
Honor Threat 3.65 1.18 9 3.53 1.66 13 3.13 1.81 8 2.96 1.56 12 4.65 1.08 8 3.58 2.23 8 3.59 0.79 11 3.11 1.52 12 
Negative Emotions 4.43 0.81 9 3.55 1.69 13 3.72 1.05 8 2.24 1.47 12 5.31 0.91 8 4.63 1.38 8 5.11 0.48 11 2.53 1.68 12 
Positive Emotions 3.37 1.65 9 4.10 1.52 13 3.08 1.11 8 3.25 1.66 12 3.83 1.17 8 4.29 1.44 8 3.58 1.25 11 4.50 1.03 12 







Descriptive Statistics for Work Scenarios in Turkey (Pilot Study) 
  Plagiarism in Work Project* 
  
True accusation False accusation  Negative Feedback  Neutral Feedback  
  Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n 
Valence 2.10 1.02 14 1.75 1.21 16 1.59 0.68 13 5.83 1.50 18 
Structure 5.65 0.76 14 5.54 1.42 16 4.94 1.25 13 5.81 1.07 18 
Feedback Fairness 6.32 0.70 14 2.83 1.85 16 4.21 0.88 13 5.83 1.10 18 
Honor Threat 5.35 1.28 14 3.55 2.13 16 2.36 1.21 13 3.68 2.08 18 
Negative Emotions 4.69 0.86 14 4.65 1.46 16 4.20 1.13 13 1.51 1.32 18 
Positive Emotions 2.60 1.71 14 3.75 1.76 16 2.99 1.14 13 4.45 1.64 18 
  Missing Meeting / Lying* 
  
True accusation False accusation  Negative Feedback  Neutral Feedback  
  Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n 
Valence 1.77 1.06 16 1.53 0.61 15 2.08 0.60 13 3.37 1.69 19 
Structure 5.96 1.07 16 6.04 1.08 15 4.74 1.60 13 5.96 1.27 19 
Feedback Fairness 5.78 1.09 16 2.83 1.16 15 3.58 1.27 13 3.50 1.48 19 
Honor Threat 5.18 1.43 15 3.66 1.51 15 2.35 1.23 12 3.22 1.50 19 
Negative Emotions 4.82 0.91 15 4.81 1.09 15 3.08 1.32 12 2.86 1.40 19 
Positive Emotions 2.02 1.07 15 2.98 1.33 15 3.28 0.92 12 2.82 1.41 19 
  Car Accident 
  
True accusation False accusation  Negative Feedback  Neutral Feedback  
  Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n 
Valence 1.79 0.76 14 1.73 0.94 17 1.81 0.81 14 3.59 1.23 15 
Structure 5.35 1.36 14 5.75 1.26 17 5.62 1.39 14 5.20 1.30 15 
Feedback Fairness 2.96 1.03 14 2.26 1.30 17 4.11 1.22 14 4.46 1.08 14 
Honor Threat 3.19 1.41 14 2.77 1.77 17 2.89 1.76 14 3.30 1.90 14 
Negative Emotions 4.93 1.33 14 4.66 1.00 17 4.10 1.34 14 2.88 1.43 14 
Positive Emotions 2.43 1.16 14 2.27 1.13 17 2.00 1.08 14 2.83 1.37 14 
  Gossip 
  
True accusation False accusation  Negative Feedback  Neutral Feedback  
  Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n 
Valence 1.33 0.51 13 1.49 0.63 15 2.31 1.00 14 3.61 1.67 19 
Structure 4.97 1.29 13 5.27 1.30 15 4.81 1.51 14 5.61 1.16 19 
Feedback Fairness 6.60 0.46 13 1.97 1.38 15 4.02 1.31 14 4.39 1.50 18 
Honor Threat 5.71 1.12 12 4.06 1.41 15 3.55 1.93 14 3.69 1.83 18 
Negative  Emotions 4.29 1.03 13 4.33 1.28 15 3.79 1.03 14 3.32 1.70 18 
Positive Emotions 2.74 1.32 13 2.89 1.61 15 2.98 1.51 14 3.80 1.55 18 






Descriptive Statistics for Work Scenarios in Northern US (Pilot Study) 
  Plagiarism in Work Project* 
  
True accusation False accusation  Negative Feedback  Neutral Feedback  
  Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n 
Valence 1.87 0.91 10 1.69 0.61 12 1.77 0.63 16 5.53 1.14 15 
Structure 5.87 1.07 10 5.94 1.69 12 5.96 0.89 16 6.24 0.74 15 
Feedback Fairness 6.20 1.10 10 2.06 1.13 12 4.59 1.19 16 5.80 0.93 15 
Honor Threat 5.13 1.69 10 3.78 1.50 12 4.59 1.69 16 4.01 1.54 15 
Negative Emotions 4.90 1.00 10 4.18 1.35 12 4.80 1.37 16 1.53 0.58 15 
Positive Emotions 3.73 1.27 10 4.03 1.40 12 3.92 1.46 16 4.47 0.70 15 
  Missing Meeting / Lying* 
  
True accusation False accusation  Negative Feedback  Neutral Feedback  
  Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n 
Valence 1.27 0.42 11 1.46 0.66 13 1.79 0.89 16 3.97 1.37 13 
Structure 6.27 0.93 11 5.85 0.85 13 6.04 0.88 16 6.31 0.71 13 
Feedback Fairness 5.82 1.02 11 2.26 0.78 13 2.81 1.45 16 4.63 1.54 13 
Honor Threat 5.33 1.13 11 4.58 1.03 13 3.91 1.45 16 3.78 1.31 13 
Negative Emotions 5.12 0.85 11 5.19 0.85 13 4.10 0.82 16 3.00 1.32 13 
Positive Emotions 3.73 1.23 11 4.41 0.90 13 3.69 1.38 16 4.18 1.03 13 
  Car Accident 
  
True accusation False accusation  Negative Feedback  Neutral Feedback  
  Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n 
Valence 1.69 0.62 13 1.33 0.49 12 1.20 0.37 15 3.40 1.40 14 
Structure 5.69 0.92 13 6.03 0.73 12 6.31 0.78 15 5.62 1.37 14 
Feedback Fairness 4.08 1.19 13 1.75 0.93 12 5.53 0.40 15 4.95 1.37 14 
Honor Threat 4.43 1.71 13 3.22 1.48 12 4.06 1.67 15 4.04 1.69 14 
Negative Emotions 5.09 1.34 13 5.06 0.97 12 4.42 0.99 15 3.35 1.04 14 
Positive Emotions 4.08 1.45 13 4.28 1.19 12 4.16 1.42 15 4.17 1.10 14 
  Gossip 
  
True accusation False accusation  Negative Feedback  Neutral Feedback  
  Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n 
Valence 1.88 1.20 11 1.67 0.47 15 2.33 0.55 12 3.03 0.92 12 
Structure 6.23 0.58 11 5.40 1.55 15 5.53 1.16 12 5.64 1.02 12 
Feedback Fairness 6.11 0.96 11 2.32 1.21 15 4.40 1.21 12 4.10 0.81 12 
Honor Threat 5.02 1.65 11 4.69 1.29 15 3.76 1.26 12 4.28 1.40 12 
Negative  Emotions 4.86 0.66 11 4.07 1.18 15 4.32 1.23 12 3.53 0.83 12 
Positive Emotions 4.33 1.14 11 3.98 1.49 15 3.75 0.61 12 3.50 0.93 12 
*Used in the main online scenario study.  
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APPENDIX D. CORRELATION TABLES  
Correlations of emotions, behavioral preferences, and demographic variables in the true accusation condition (Experiment 1) 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Turkey              
1. Negative Emotions    .53***    .93***   .38**       .86***        .48***  .12     .43**     .38**      .43** -.02  .09  .05 -.17 
2. Shame   .45**     .65*** .21  .05    .35* .15 .14  .00    .34*  .09  .14  .04 
3. Humiliation-Related   .24+       .67***        .50***  .05     .45**     .41**      .45** -.11  .15  .18 -.17 
4. Guilt    .09 -.16      .37** .14 .01 -.23      .41**  .07  .10  .01 
5. Anger-Related             .54*** -.03     .38**   .35*        .53*** -.15  .08 -.07 -.22 
6. Competitive        .00      .54***       .56***        .91***   -.25+  .18 -.10 -.02 
7. Cooperative           .44**       .49*** -.19        .92*** -.11 -.07  .05 
8. Avoidant               .70***    .29* .19  .04   -.29*   -.24+ 
9. Indirect Cooperative              .37** .14  .03 -.14 -.08 
10. Retaliation             -.38**  .15 -.03 -.05 
11. Apology           -.14 -.02  .06 
12. Age             .04   -.26+ 
13. Upbringing                .30* 
14. SES              
US              
1. Negative Emotions .22       .94***    .26+         .85*** .27*      .38**        .50***       .43**      .26+  .13 -.07 -.10  .16 
2. Shame  .13       .74*** -.19   -.63***        .53*** -.22 -.17        -.55***        .70***  .02 -.06  .12 
3. Humiliation-Related   .14         .73*** .31*      .36**         .52***        .47***     .27*  .09 -.04 -.11  .16 
4. Guilt    -.10   -.58***        .41*** -.18   -.23+        -.51***        .59*** -.02 -.08  .11 
5. Anger-Related         .55***  .12        .56***       .46***         .52*** -.19 -.11 -.05  .11 
6. Competitive       -.18        .63***       .56***         .92***       -.59*** -.01 -.11 -.09 
7. Cooperative         .18     .37** -.18        .83***     -.35**  .04 -.08 
8. Avoidant               .54***         .52*** -.15 -.06  .01 -.14 
9. Indirect Cooperative                  .55*** -.18 -.06 -.01 -.07 
10. Retaliation                -.55*** -.02 -.08 -.03 
11. Apology             -.29*  .09 -.05 
12. Age             .00 -.08 
13. Upbringing              .12 
14. SES                           







Correlations of emotions, behavioral preferences, and demographic variables in the negative performance feedback condition 
(Experiment 1)   
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 11 12 13 14 
Turkey              
Turkey .52***   .91***   .46**         .73***        .47***    .35*        .47***     .61***     .24+  .18 .08  .08    .29* 
1. Negative Emotions  .37**     .50***   .05 -.06      .42**  .14 .34* -.20    .35* .15  .03 -.04 
2. Shame   .34*        .54***        .52***    .32*        .50***     .61***  .23  .12 .02  .04    .29* 
3. Humiliation-Related    -.01 .00        .64*** -.04 .30*   -.25+        .60*** .09  .07  .17 
4. Guilt           .51*** -.09      .43**   .38**        .53*** -.22 .05  .04  .21 
5. Anger-Related        .00        .62***    .57***        .67*** -.22 .17 -.07  .11 
6. Competitive           .31*  .43**   -.30*        .93*** .18  .18    .31* 
7. Cooperative            .48***    .34*  .14 .13 -.07  .13 
8. Avoidant             .34*  .09 .22  .18  .02 
9. Indirect Cooperative               -.43** .17 -.10 -.04 
10. Retaliation           .12  .11    .29* 
11. Apology                -.43** -.16 
12. Age                  .44** 
13. Upbringing              
14. SES              
US .51***     .90***       .50***       .75***  .27*      .45**     .40**       .46***    .23+       .34** -.01  .06   .05 
1. Negative Emotions  .33*       .69*** .05 -.34*        .53*** .20 .11  -.34*         .59*** -.12  .10 -.14 
2. Shame   .25       .55***    .34**      .37**     .38**     .44**   .28*     .24+  .08  .07   .07 
3. Humiliation-Related    .19 -.26+        .52*** .19 .17  -.28*        .58*** -.17  .13 -.10 
4. Guilt        .43**  .07   .27*     .40**      .39** -.05  .00 -.02  .19 
5. Anger-Related       -.05       .55***     .38**        .91***   -.25+ -.10 -.04  .11 
6. Competitive             .56***       .57*** -.03        .94*** -.13 -.04 -.19 
7. Cooperative               .55***        .49***      .39** -.11 -.07 -.05 
8. Avoidant             .27*    .29*  .07 -.03  .00 
9. Indirect Cooperative           -.18 -.16 -.09  .00 
10. Retaliation           -.18 -.03 -.18 
11. Apology             .06 -.06 
12. Age                .34* 
13. Upbringing                           








Correlations of emotions, behavioral preferences, and demographic variables in the false accusation condition (Experiment 1)  
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Turkey              
1. Negative Emotions .54***     .87*** .24        .74***     .33*   .20 .14      .47**    .31*  .00  .16  .21  .07 
2. Shame  .33* .20  .20 -.03     .33* .17  .24 -.05  .22    .25+  .08 -.08 
3. Humiliation-Related   .12      .47**     .26+   .07 .13      .41**  .15 -.11  .06  .22  .11 
4. Guilt    -.10 -.03         .52*** .04 -.06  .03        .61*** -.04 -.07 -.17 
5. Anger-Related           .41** -.10 .01      .42**        .53*** -.28  .20  .15  .11 
6. Competitive        .00  .38*      .46**        .75*** -.18    .29+ -.10   -.26+ 
7. Cooperative         .31*    .26+ -.17        .86*** .10 -.04  .05 
8. Avoidant          .18  .14  .17 .20 -.12 -.22 
9. Indirect Cooperative             .27+ -.22 .14  .09 -.01 
10. Retaliation            -.25+ .10 -.13 -.13 
11. Apology           .06 -.11  .02 
12. Age            -.15   -.29+ 
13. Upbringing                  .42** 
14. SES              
US              
1. Negative Emotions .51***       .88***  .20        .82*** .22  .04  .09    .26+  .17 -.03  .03  .02  .07 
2. Shame  .16        .61***  .19 .08    .30*  .13  .16  .07    .29*  .03  .13  .09 
3. Humiliation-Related   -.10        .70*** .10 -.04  .01  .17  .04 -.10 -.01 -.06  .00 
4. Guilt    -.14 .09    .34*    .26* -.12  .17      .42**  .01  .11  .06 
5. Anger-Related        .33* -.18 -.01      .39**    .31*  -.31*  .01 -.06  .04 
6. Competitive       -.19      .40**    .29*        .80***  -.26*  .04 -.11 -.07 
7. Cooperative             .44**  .14  -.33*        .93*** -.07 -.07  .10 
8. Avoidant         -.06 .08        .47***  .06 -.15 -.14 
9. Indirect Cooperative            .24+ -.21   -.31* -.19  .13 
10. Retaliation              -.37**  .09 -.07  .03 
11. Apology            .04 -.01  .07 
12. Age             .00  .10 
13. Upbringing              .06 
14. SES                           









Correlations of emotions, behavioral preferences, and demographic variables in the neutral feedback condition (Experiment 1)  
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Turkey              
1. Negative Emotions .77*** .95*** .88*** .90***   .32* .32*   .39** .16   .30* .34*   .24+ -.21   -.23+ 
2. Shame  .66*** .80*** .50***   .24+ .30* .29* .07 .18 .34*     .43** -.14 -.20 
3. Humiliation-Related   .74*** .81***     .36** .25+   .40** .16   .32* .26+ .14 -.20 -.16 
4. Guilt    .71***   .26+ .35*   .39** .16 .22   .38**   .27* -.17   -.23+ 
5. Anger-Related      .23 .24+ .29* .15   .27+ .26+ .16   -.28*   -.27* 
6. Competitive           .73***    .77***       .69***      .82***    .64*** .08  .15 -.06 
7. Cooperative           .72***       .72***    .43**    .96*** .07  .17 -.14 
8. Avoidant               .65***      .61***    .65*** .08  .11 -.18 
9. Indirect Cooperative               .54***    .53*** .01  .16 -.05 
10. Retaliation           .37**   .23+  .16 -.05 
11. Apology           .12  .15 -.16 
12. Age            -.13 -.12 
13. Upbringing                .28* 
14. SES              
US              
1. Negative Emotions .83*** .96*** .82*** .94***   .49**   .32*   .52*** .22   .53***    .32*  .02 -.03 -.14 
2. Shame  .70*** .83*** .73*** .33*   .30* .42** .11 .43**    .37* -.05  .02 -.07 
3. Humiliation-Related   .71*** .86***     .50***   .30*   .56***   .25+   .50***    .27+  .02 -.04 -.19 
4. Guilt    .72***   .46**     .40** .48**   .26+   .54***     .43**  .01  .03  .03 
5. Anger-Related        .43** .24 .41** .14   .49*** .24  .04 -.04 -.14 
6. Competitive             .65***   .79***       .64***   .88***       .59***  .02  .01 -.10 
7. Cooperative          .74***       .84***   .53***       .96***  .08 -.09  .06 
8. Avoidant               .61***   .65***       .69*** -.13  .02 -.10 
9. Indirect Cooperative          .46**       .70***  .10   -.27+  .14 
10. Retaliation                .52***  .01  .14  .03 
11. Apology            .03  .01  .05 
12. Age            -.17 -.02 
13. Upbringing                .35* 
14. SES                           









Correlations of emotions, behavioral preferences, and demographic variables in the true accusation condition (Experiment 2)  
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Turkey              
1. Negative Emotions .32*       .69***   .81***        .61***       .82***   -.32* -.04   .36*  .10 -.09 -.09  .05 -.15 
2. Shame  .16 .45** -.04   .28+ -.10 -.13 .21        .49***  .05 -.14 -.19 -.11 
3. Humiliation-Related     .58***        .64*** .22 -.20  .21 .05  .08  .16 -.10  .06   -.28+ 
4. Guilt         .38**       .59*** -.19 -.14   .31*  .19 -.22   -.27+ -.02 -.05 
5. Anger-Related        .24+ -.15  .19 .02 -.23  .10 -.11  .05 -.22 
6. Competitive         -.31* -.19    .46**  .10   -.24+  .03  .04  .00 
7. Cooperative            -.38**     -.70***  .12  .04  .13 -.03  .12 
8. Avoidant           -.38**   -.28* -.04  .01 -.06 -.06 
9. Indirect Cooperative           .08 -.01 -.14  .08 -.08 
10. Retaliation          -.07  .19  -.34* -.01 
11. Apology            .07  .20 -.16 
12. Age            -.01   -.27+ 
13. Upbringing              .17 
14. SES              
US              
1. Negative Emotions .29+       .81***     .85***       .68***     .90*** -.24 .14    .26+ .24   -.34*  .04  .13  .21 
2. Shame  .11 .37* .01 .35* -.07 .22 -.04 .14  .15 -.22    .33*  .08 
3. Humiliation-Related       .54***       .73***     .59***   -.31* .07    .39* .21 -.12  .00 -.01 -.02 
4. Guilt        .46**     .81*** -.11 .07  .15 .08   -.30*  .07  .02  .22 
5. Anger-Related      .37*   -.34* .09    .37*   .26+   -.37* -.04 -.21  .06 
6. Competitive       -.12 .17  .09 .19   -.28+  .02    .32*    .35* 
7. Cooperative        -.37*      -.64*** -.32* -.10  .21  .03  .19 
8. Avoidant          -.31* .24 -.08  -.36*  .21  .20 
9. Indirect Cooperative          .23  .05  .17 -.15 -.20 
10. Retaliation          -.06 -.05  .05 -.11 
11. Apology              -.49**  .11 -.24 
12. Age            -.16 -.05 
13. Upbringing                .32* 
14. SES                           








Correlations of emotions, behavioral preferences, and demographic variables in the negative performance feedback condition  
(Experiment 2)  
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Turkey              
1. Negative Emotions .11     .79***       .90***       .53***        .87***  .07  .08  .03  .14 -.21   -.24+  .20 .09 
2. Shame  .25+ .22 .04 -.03 -.03  .05  .08  .16  .03 -.10    .24+ .14 
3. Humiliation-Related         .69***     .37**        .54***  .11  .09 -.20  .06 -.14 -.22  .10 .06 
4. Guilt          .53***        .73***  .00  .20  .00  .10 -.22 -.23    .26+ .14 
5. Anger-Related         .31* -.18  .17    .36*  .12  .06 -.19 -.05 -.34* 
6. Competitive        .14 -.07  .03  .10   -.26+   -.25+    .26+ .13 
7. Cooperative          -.30*     -.40** -.17 -.17  .11   -.27+   .24+ 
8. Avoidant         -.06 -.06  .19 -.13    .35*   .27+ 
9. Indirect Cooperative           .17  .09 -.06  .11 -.30* 
10. Retaliation          -.17 -.02  .11 .09 
11. Apology            .04 -.03 -.26+ 
12. Age            -.07 .05 
13. Upbringing               .34* 
14. SES              
US              
1. Negative Emotions .34*     .89***       .89***       .61***    .84***   -.30* -.03     .40** -.04     -.49**  .13  .02 .08 
2. Shame  .25+ .19 .21  .43** -.18  .12   .32*  .12   -.30*  .10 -.06 .15 
3. Humiliation-Related         .84***       .54***    .62***   -.25+ -.07   .34* -.03     -.44**  .20 -.03 .10 
4. Guilt          .56***    .60***   -.29+  .00   .35* -.01     -.43**  .18 -.01 .09 
5. Anger-Related      .29+   -.34*  .11     .38** -.15 -.14    .25+  .03 .11 
6. Competitive       -.19 -.07   .27+ -.03     -.48** -.10  .09 .01 
7. Cooperative        -.19    -.45**  .07  .03 -.10  .02 .08 
8. Avoidant         .14  .02  .05  .22  .05   .26+ 
9. Indirect Cooperative          -.04   -.26+  .04 -.09 .24 
10. Retaliation          -.02 -.11 -.21 .11 
11. Apology            .03 -.01 .08 
12. Age            -.07 .03 
13. Upbringing             .23 
14. SES                           








Correlations of emotions, behavioral preferences, and demographic variables in the false accusation condition (Experiment 2)  
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Turkey              
1. Negative Emotions .00     .72***       .85***       .47***         .88***  .12 NA -.10    .28*   -.30* -.11 -.07  .12 
2. Shame  .23+ .04 .02 -.05 -.08 NA  .10    .24+ -.03 -.02 -.05  .18 
3. Humiliation-Related         .59***       .51***      .41**  .06 NA  .01    .24+ -.06 -.03 -.13  .03 
4. Guilt      .22+        .72***  .14 NA -.16    .31* -.18 -.07 -.12  .12 
5. Anger-Related       .21 -.10 NA  .08  .14 -.11 -.14  .05  .08 
6. Competitive        .12 NA -.10    .22+     -.43** -.10 -.05  .19 
7. Cooperative        NA   -.28*  .13 -.03  .05  .07  .13 
8. Avoidant          NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
9. Indirect Cooperative          -.07 -.04 -.03  .07 -.13 
10. Retaliation           .17 -.11  .09      .38** 
11. Apology            .06  .06 -.08 
12. Age            -.03 -.21 
13. Upbringing                .31* 
14. SES              
US              
1. Negative Emotions .25+         .52***       .81***       .49***        .80*** -.06     .28+  .18    .27+ -.18  .03 -.12  .22 
2. Shame  -.06 .23 .08  .21  .17 -.18 -.15  .23 -.13 -.16  .00  .09 
3. Humiliation-Related     .34*       .85***  .00   -.26+        .77*** -.01 -.13  .02 -.04  .03  .08 
4. Guilt    .24        .63***  .07  .09 -.02  .22   -.26+  .04  .00  .17 
5. Anger-Related      -.02   -.37*        .67*** -.09 -.13  .11 -.12 -.07  .12 
6. Competitive        .09 -.12    .33*      .40**   -.26+  .13 -.14  .16 
7. Cooperative          -.36* -.18  .17   -.28+ -.09  .22  .04 
8. Avoidant         -.04 -.04  .15 -.08  .06 -.09 
9. Indirect Cooperative          -.01  .12  .05 -.08 -.05 
10. Retaliation          -.22  .04   -.25+  .02 
11. Apology           -.18    .31*   -.28+ 
12. Age            -.23  .17 
13. Upbringing             -.14 
14. SES                           








Correlations of emotions, behavioral preferences, and demographic variables in the neutral feedback condition (Experiment 2)  
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Turkey              
1. Negative Emotions .17       .90***       .78***     .84***       .78*** NA -.07 -.07 -.09 -.21   -.26+ -.03   -.28+ 
2. Shame  .17 .09 .28+ .00 NA -.11    .39*  .16 -.14 -.20   -.34* -.15 
3. Humiliation-Related         .70***     .87***     .49** NA -.12 -.16 -.07   -.32* -.25 -.03   -.27+ 
4. Guilt        .62***       .59*** NA  .20  .00  .15 -.13   -.31*  .07   -.25+ 
5. Anger-Related          .44** NA -.10 -.06  .05   -.32*   -.31* -.21   -.34* 
6. Competitive       NA .06  .04 -.19 -.06 -.12  .10 -.04 
7. Cooperative         NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
8. Avoidant         -.10  .17  .11 -.15  .17  .09 
9. Indirect Cooperative          -.06 -.04    .26+ -.21 -.10 
10. Retaliation           .15 -.19 -.07  .12 
11. Apology            .02 -.07 -.04 
12. Age             .08  .16 
13. Upbringing                .35* 
14. SES              
US              
1. Negative Emotions .27+       .75***     .77***     .85***       .92*** NA NA -.14   .30+ -.07  .08 -.07 .03 
2. Shame  .20 .32* .37* .17 NA NA  .04 .14 -.01     -.49** -.26 .00 
3. Humiliation-Related       .56***     .67***       .59*** NA NA -.08 .18 -.06 -.09 -.04 .25 
4. Guilt        .69***       .59*** NA NA -.18 .17 -.23 -.22  .09 .02 
5. Anger-Related            .69*** NA NA -.07   .35* -.13 -.16 -.13 .07 
6. Competitive       NA NA -.12   .27+ -.04  .25 -.05 .05 
7. Cooperative        NA  NA NA  NA  NA  NA NA 
8. Avoidant          NA NA  NA  NA  NA NA 
9. Indirect Cooperative          .19  .22 -.01 -.10 .12 
10. Retaliation           .03 -.22  .11 .10 
11. Apology            .06 -.07  -.29+ 
12. Age            -.12 .06 
13. Upbringing             .04 
14. SES                           







APPENDIX E. INSTRUMENTS 
Demographic Information 
What is your current age in years? 
What is your gender?  
 Female___  Male____ 
Please indicate the average income level of your immediate family (circle one number): 
1-$25.000 or below 
2-$25.001 - $35.000 
3-$35.001 - $45.000 
4-$45.001 - $55.000 
5-$55.001 - $65.000 
6-$65.001 - $75.000 
7-$75.001 - $85.000 
8-$85.001 - $95.000 
9-$95.001 - $105.000 
10-$105.001 and above 
What is your socioeconomic status? 
1-very poor 2 3 4 5-middle class 6 7 8 9-very wealthy 
How would you characterize your upbringing? 1-very rural 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9-very urban 
 What is the ethnic identification that best describes you? 
 Caucasian American 
 African American 
 Asian American 
 Hispanic American 
 Native American 
 Multi-racial American 
 International student (please specify your country) 




What is your first language? 
 English 
 Other (please specify) 
Where were you born? (City & Country) 
How long have you lived in the United States in years? 
       years 
 < 1 year 
How devout a religious follower are you? 
1-Not at all devout 2 3 4 5-Somewhat devout 6 7 8 9-Extremely devout 




Individual Problem #1 
 
Janet, Barbara, and Elaine are a housewife, lawyer, and physicist, although not 
necessarily in that order.  Janet lives next door to the housewife.  Barbara is the 
physicist’s best friend.  Elaine once wanted to be a lawyer but decided against it.  Janet 
has seen Barbara within the last two days, but has not seen the physicist. 
 
Janet, Barbara and Elaine are, in that order, the 
 
a. Housewife, physicist, lawyer 
b. Physicist, lawyer, housewife 
c. Physicist, housewife, lawyer 
d. Lawyer, housewife, physicist 
 












Team Problem # 1 
Right now Bethany is 12. You can find her older brother's age by switching the digits in 
Bethany's age. They'll be able to switch the digits in their ages again sometime in the 
future. How old will Bethany and her brother be when this happens?  
 
How old will Bethany be?  ___________ 
 
How old will Bethany’s brother be?  __________ 
 
Team Problem # 2 
A man is looking at a portrait and says "Brothers and sisters I have none, but that man's 
father is my father's son." 
Who is the man looking at a portrait of? 
 
 
Teamwork and Self-Evaluation Survey (1 – not at all to 7 – extremely) 
 
1) How much did you contribute to the team logic problems? 
2) How would you rate your logical thinking ability? 
3) How would you rate your communication skills? 
4) How would you rate your decision making skills? 
5) How would you rate your team’s ability to work well together? 
6) How would you rate your team’s efficiency? 
7) How would you rate your team’s success? 
8) How willing are you to work with your teammate again? 
 





Ultimatum Game  
Participants will see the offer and the total amount one by one in a randomized order. 
(e.g., “Total amount: $10, Offer: $3;” “Total amount: $3, Offer: $1.4” etc.).   
 








  Total $ 45% 30% 20% 
High Stake 10 4.5 3.0 2.0 
High Stake 15 6.8 4.5 3.0 
High Stake 20 9.0 6.0 4.0 
Low Stake 2.25 1.0 0.7 0.5 
Low Stake 3 1.4 0.9 0.6 
Low Stake 5 2.3 1.5 1.0 
 




1. Overall, how competent was the experimenter? 
2. How clear was the experimenter in giving the instructions of the study? 
3. How respectful was the experimenter? 




1. How helpful was your teammate when you worked together? 
2. How knowledgeable do you think s/he is? 
3. How respectful was your teammate when you worked together? 
4. How much did your teammate contribute to the team logic problems? 
5. How would you rate your teammate’s logical thinking ability? 
6. How would you rate your teammate’s communication skills? 




1. Do you have any questions about the study?  
2. Was the experiment clear in its overall purpose?  
3. Did all aspects of the procedure make sense?   
4. Was anything odd or confusing?  
5. Had you heard anything about this study before coming?  
6. In your own words, what do you think is the purpose of this study?  
7. Do you have any feedback or suggestions for our study?  
